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A TRG President's Foreword
The Air Transport Research Group of the WCTR Society was formally launched as a
special interest group at the 7th Triennial WCTR in Sydney, Australia in 1995. Since then, our
membership base has expanded rapidly, and now includes over 400 active transportation
researchers, policy- makers, industry executives, major corporations and research institutes from
28 countries. Our broad membership base and its strong enthusiasm have pushed the group
forward, to continuously initiate new events and projects that benefit the aviation industry and
research communities worldwide.
It became a tradition that the ATRG would hold an international conference at least once
a year. As you know, the 1997 conference was held in Vancouver, Canada. Over 90 papers,
panel discussions and invited speeches were presented. In 1998, the ATRG organized a
consecutive stream of 14 aviation sessions at the 8 th Triennial WCTR Conference (July 12-17:
Antwerp). Again, on 19-21 July, 1998, the ATRG Symposium was organized and executed every
successfully by Dr. Aisling Reynolds-Feighan of the University College of Dublin.
As in the past, the Aviation Institute at the University of Nebraska at Omaha (Dr. Brent
Bowen, Director of the Institute) has kindly agreed to publish the Proceedings of the 1998 ATRG
Dublin Symposium (being co-edited by Dr. Aisling Reynolds-Feighan and Professor Brent
Bowen), and the Proceedings of the 1998 WCTR-ATRG Conference (being co-edited by
Professors Tae H. Oum and Brent Bowen). On behalf of the ATRG members, I would like to
express my sincere appreciation to Professor Brent Bowen and to the staff at the Aviation
Institute of UNO for their efforts in publishing these ATRG proceedings. Also, I would like to
thank and congratulate all the authors of the papers, for their fine contribution to the conferences
and the Proceedings.
Finally, I would like to draw your attention to the ATRG newsletter and the ATRG
website (www.commerce.ubc.ca/atrg/) which will keep you informed of the ATRG operations
and forthcoming events. On behalf of the ATRG Networking Committee, I would also appreciate
it very much if you would encourage others in the field, to sign up for ATRG membership.
Thank you for your attention.
Tae H. Oum
President, ATRG
ATRG c/o Prof. Tae H. Oum
Faculty of Commerce and Business Administration,
University of British Columbia, 2053 Main Mall
Vancouver, B.C., V6T 1Z2
Canada
E-mail: Atrg_commerce.ubc.ca

OPENING ADDRESS AT THE 1998 ATRG DUBLIN SYMPOSIUM
Tae H. Oum
President,
Air Transport Research Group
Dr. Cosgrove, Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen,
As the President of the Air Transport Research Group, it gives me great pleasure to
welcome all of you to the 1998 symposium. The ATRG was originally founded in
Sydney in 1995 as a special interest group of the WCTR Society. While the purposes of
the ATRG continue to evolve, may I attempt to summarize them in several categories
here tonight:
1) To provide independent forum for discussion on all issues in aviation.
2) To promote interaction among aviation researchers, policy- makers and managers/
executives.
3) To encourage the collaborative research of international scope such as: hub- and-
spoke systems involving cross-
boundary airline networks; bilateral/multilateral liberalization; performance evaluations
of carriers and airports.
4) To cultivate the exchange of ideas, data, and research results among researchers
around the world.
To begin to accomplish these objectives, the ATRG held its first conference in July,
1997, in Vancouver, Canada, where more than 90 papers and panel presentations were
made. This year, we organized 14 consecutive aviation/airport sessions (54 aviation
papers) at the 8th WCTR in Antwerp, Belgium. Today and tomorrow, this symposium in
Dublin will provide yet another important forum for us to engage in lively discussions on
some critical issues regarding airlines and airports. This symposium is particularly timely
because we anticipate that major changes will be forthcoming in the European aviation
industry.
Ladies and Gentlemen, I am also pleased to announce that our colleagues in Hong Kong,
represented by Professors Anmin and Yimin Zhang, and Jong Park, will be hosting the
next ATRG conference some time in June 1999. Given the young age of the ATRG (only
a 3- year old baby), you will all agree with me that the ATRG has made remarkable
progress in achieving some of its goals. Membership wise, we are approaching some 400
individual and organizational members. Every year, the quantity and quality of our papers
and debates, have grown and improved.
Forexample,at theWCTR in Antwerp, held last week, our aviation papers won 3 out of
10 awards, including:
Best Paper Award from the WCTR Society,
Special Young Prize Award from the Antwerp High Council of Diamonds,
Be- Ne- Lux Transport Economics Award.
These papers were chosen out of nearly 900 papers that were presented. Ladies and
Gentlemen, let me do a small commercial ifI may: we are a Winning Group! If you are
not already a member, please sign up for membership TODAY.
My sixth sense tells me that starting this year, the ATRG needs to embark on several
group projects of international scope. For this, I will be seeking your opinions during the
ATRG Business meeting. TODAY and TOMORROW, I look forward to stimulate
discussions on some important matters involving the European and world aviationindustries.
Before closing, I would like to express our deep appreciation to Dr. Art Cosgrove,
President of UCD, for the marvelous support, received from his institution. I would also
like to formally thank Dr. Aisling Reynolds-Feighan for her near solo effort to prepare
and execute this symposium. My thanks also goes to Dr. Reynolds-Feighan's colleagues,
students and other university staff members for their help and support.
With these remarks, I am now pleased to declare the opening of the 1998 ATRG Dublin
Symposium: European Air Transport in the New Millennium.
Thank you very much.
AIR TRANSPORT RESEARCH GROUP OF WCTR
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DUBLIN 2
IRISH AIR TRANSPORT POLICY IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM
S_SECTORAL CONTEXT
In keeping with the long run global trend in international trade from
protectionism to flee trade, civil aviation has in recent years been moving from
a structure characterised by:
• exchange of traffic between national governments as elements of national
sovereignty;
* approval of air fares nominally reserved to national governments but in
reality delegated to fare-fixing conferences of nationally-owned "flag-
carrier" airlines;
• airports as State-owned public utilities; and
• provision of air navigation services by national governmental authorities;
to a structure characterised by:
liberal "single market" competition principles within major trading blocs
such as the European Union and the USA and moves towards "common
aviation areas" on a multilateral basis between those trading blocs;
growth in privately owned airlines and in the privatisation of the formertt " )t
flag-career national airlines, combined with an increasing tendency for
regional and global strategic alliances between airlines;
the gradual evolution of airports into more commercial entities and the
privatisation of airports in some countries; and similarly
a move towards corporatisation and privatisation of national air navigation
services.
The driving force behind this process has been the realisation on the part of
governments that the former structures militated against cost effective
commercial practices and thus against economic growth and prosperity
generally.
The Department of Public Enterprise has played an active part in the EU arena
in the change from protectionism to competition. The benefits have been
apparent in the strong growth of Irish aviation and downward pressure on air
fares in our main markets of the UK, the rest of Europe and the USA. Aviation
liberalisation has been one of the main contributors to the success of our
tourism sector over the last decade.
The following paragraphs are an in_oduction to sectoral issues which are
addressed later in this paper in the context of objectives, strategies etc.
AIR SAFETY
The international emphasis on cost efficiency in the drive towards lower air
fares is one of the principal features of the new competitive aviation
environment. Care needs to be taken that cost efficiency is not achieved at the
expense of safety and that the traditionally very high standards of safety in Irish
and international civil aviation are maintained. The emphasis on cost
efficiency must be matched by constant renewal of the emphasis on safety on
the part of the operators (aircraft and component manufactures, airlines,
airports and air traffic control agencies) and the overseeing national and
international safety regulatory authorities.
AIRSPACE MANAGEMENT
The European institutional arrangements in air traffic management are
traditionally based on an excessive emphasis on national sovereignty and the
independence of national air traffic management agencies. The new
Eurocontrol Convention signed by Ireland and other European States in June,
1997, when brought into force, will provide for a stronger Eurocontrol Agency,
with the emphasis on integrated international airspace management.
Globalisation in systems and management through the development of new
satellite based technologies is the major medium term challenge facing the
European airspace management system. These developments taken in context
of Ireland's unique geographical position at the interface between the North
Atlantic and Europe require a proactive response to the opportunities and
challenges presented.
.THE ENVIRONMENT
There is an increasing emphasis in international fora on the impact of aviation
on the environment, in terms of noise and air pollution. Possible measures to
lessen these negative effects are being discussed including taxation of aviation
fuel. Agreement on such measures will involve reconciling policies on
protecting the environment with policies aimed at maximising the growth of
aviation.
TRANSATLANTIC SERVICEY
As proposed in the 1997 Statement of Strategy, the Shannon stop requirement
(whereby airlines that wish to operate direct transatlantic services to Dublin
must operate an equivalent number of direct services to Shannon in any twelve
month period) has been reviewed and it has been reaffirmed as Government
policy. The requirement owes its existence to the desire of successive
Governments to favour balanced regional development. The commercial
success of Shannon airport is seen as a very important driver of the economy of
the mid West region. In that regard, the decision of Continental Airlines to
inaugurate year round scheduled services to both Shannon and Dublin from
June, 1998 is particularly welcome.
AIRPORTS
The threatened ending of duty-free in mid 1999 is a major strategic issue which
would severely impact on the finances of both the State and the regional
airports, thereby putting upward pressure on airport charges to airlines and
hence on air fares.
Major programmes of capital expenditure, funded by Aer Rianta, are underway
at the three State airports to cope with increasing passenger and freight
throughput.
A package of Exchequer financial support for infrastructural improvements to
be implemented in 1998 has also been put in place by the Government for the
regional airports. This is in addition to the Exchequer marketing assistance
programme for those airports which runs to end 1999. In order to improve
access to and from those airports, the Department has in place a scheme of
Exchequer subvented public service obligation air services connecting them
with Dublin airport.
4SECTORAL OBJECTIVES
The Department has the following objectives for the air transport sector:
• To ensure that the standards, safety and security of aviation continue to
inspire confidence in the use of Irish aerospace and technical infxastructure;
• To facilitate and encourage a wide range of reliable, regular and competitive
commercial air services for Irish tourism, trade and industry;
• To seek to maintain at least one domestically based and financially viable
airline of sufficient scale to provide air services between Ireland and all our
main export markets on a year round basis; and
• To ensure that Irish airports are cost competitive and have appropriate
infrastructure to meet the current and prospective needs of the international
airline industry.
SECTORAL STRATEGIES AND OUTPUTS
In the case of aviation, the individual strategies and outputs often contribute to
achieving a number of sectoral objectives. The key strategies and related
outputs to be pursued are based on maximising growth of Irish aviation in the
current economic climate and positioning the Irish aviation sector to cope with
the next downturn in international aviation in the longer term.
The Department seeks to ensure the achievement of objectives in air transport
in a number of ways.
Development of Air Services by:
- encouraging the development of new air services to and from Ireland
through the conclusion of liberal bilateral air services agreements with non-
EU states
- implementing the scheme of public service obligation air services
connecting Dublin airport with the regional airports.
Proposing a more clearly defined Airports Regulatory Framework
- in response to the change in legal status of Aer Rianta coupled with
emerging regulatory legislation at European level on airport ground
handling services and airport charges.
Continuing the campaign against the decision to end mtra-EU Duty free sales
as set out m the Programme for Government
- by seeking agreement between all EU Governments and the European
Commission that abolition of duty free is not in the interests of the
European aviation sector and European consumer generally.
Responding to technological developments in airspace management:
- by developing, in conjunction with the Irish Aviation Authority, a strategy
for a coherent and proactive response to the emerging satellite based air
traffic management system.
Creation of more effective rater-governmental agencies for dealing with key
issues:
by taking a proactive part in European efforts to create more effective inter-
governmental agencies for the management of airspace and regulation of air
safety.
pERFORMANCE INDICATORS
Seetorai
• Continued safe operation of Irish aviation, as evidenced by the low level of
accidents and incidents relative to the scale of air operations.
Continued safe, orderly and expeditious flow of traffic in and through Irish
controlled airspace, at lowest possible cost.
Growth in the range of air services and in passenger and freight traffic to
and from Ireland.
Increase in the number and scale of Irish airlines, based on commercially
sustainable growth.
Removal of capacity constraints in infrastructure at Irish international
airports.
Improvement in the competitive positions of Irish international airports as
far as airport charges are concerned.
6Departmental
• further bilateral air service agreements with non-EU States to be concluded.
• effective implementation of the scheme of public service obligation air
services.
• proposals for a more clearly defined airports regulatory framework,
including a formal bench-marking process for the airports, to be finalised in
1998; necessary measures arising therefrom to be implemented in 1999.
completion in 1998 of proposals for responding to the future satellite based
air traffic management technologies and follow through in subsequent years
of any necessary policy initiatives arising.
a restructured Eurocontrol agency operating under the new Eurocontrol
Convention, by the end of 1999.
political agreement on a pan-European level on the form, structure and
functions of a new European air safety regulatory body, by the end of 1999.
SHAREHOLDER ISSUES
Aer Lingus
Aer Lingus has emerged from its financial crisis of the early 1990s. The
position of the Government and the European Commission is that further State
aid for Aer Lingus is ruled out. The strongest possible commercial focus
within Aer Lingus is therefore essential. While progress has been made, unless
the commercial imperative continues to be accepted throughout the Aer Lingus
Group, there is a risk that the Group will be unable to control its cost base
sufficiently and adapt its commercial strategies so as to withstand increasing
competitive pressures, particularly when exacerbated by the next cyclical
downturn in the aviation industry. The putting in place in late 1997 within Aer
Lingus of an agreed partnership process to achieve further significant cost
savings is, therefore, of great importance.
The Irish Aviation Policy document published in 1994 stated that the
Government would encourage Aer Lingus to develop appropriate strategic
alliance and that all proposals would be considered on their merits. The 1997
Statement of Strategy mandated the Board of Aer Lingus to explore the
possibilities of entering into a major strategic alliance, with or without the
transfer of equity, andto submit proposals to the shareholder. The Board's
response is awaited.
Shareholder Mandate
• Continue to operate in accordance with strict commercial criteria;
• Ensure that results and shareholder value benchmark favourably with
comparable competing private sector airlines within a two or four year
timescale; and
Submit proposals to the shareholder in relation to the possibilities of
entering into a major strategic alliance, with or without the transfer of
equity.
Aer Rianta
Aer Rianta's current legal status as an agent of the Minister is an anachronism.
It needs to be established as a normal commercial State company. This
involves transferring the three State airports from the Minister's ownership to
that of Aer Rianta. The recently enacted Aer Navigation and Transport Act,
1998 makes the necessary statutory arrangements for these changes and will be
implemented from 1 January 1999.
The threatened ending of duty-free in mid 1999 is a major strategic issue which
would severely impact on the finances of Aer Rianta, thereby putting upward
pressure on airport charges to airlines and hence on air fares.
Shareholder Mandate
• Provide the necessary infrastructure and services to Dublin, Shannon and
Cork airports, at the lowest possible cost, consistent with safety and
commercial operations;
• Provide a financial return to the shareholder consistent with the foregoing
requirement;
Promote the development of traffic at Dublin, Shannon and Cork airports;
and
Exploit new business opportunities, provided they are organically linked to
the company's core business and do not detract from core responsibilities.
Irish Aviation Authority
IJdarfis Eitliochta na hl_ireann
The Irish Aviation Authority since its inception in 1993 has successfully
managed its transition from within the Department to a commercial State
company.
The continuing growth in air traffic and the axdval of satellite based
technologies designed to make more efficient and safer use of air space axe the
major challenges facing the Authority in the future.
Shareholder Mandate
• Provide air navigation and safety regulatory services which axe cost
effective, correspond to best international practice, and continue to inspire
confidence in the use of Irish airspace and technical infrastructure;
• Discharge its statutory obligation to be self-financing; and
• Exploit new business opportunities, provided they axe organically linked to
the Authority's core functions and do not detract from core responsibilities.
Plenary Session:
Irish Air Transport Policy in the New Millennium
John Burke
Chief Executive, Aer Rianta, Irish Airports
Thank you Chairman. Good moming Ladies and Gentlemen. I'm delighted that this seminar is
taking place and I'm very pleased to be invited to participate in it. Aer Rianta is responsible
for the management and operation of the three state airports in Ireland, Dublin, Shannon and
Cork airports. As Dr Fitzgerald, (the session Chairman) mentioned we have extensive
interests overseas in the duty free business and more recently in airport ownership and we own
the Great Southern Hotels chain in Ireland. The Minister for Public Enterprise, Mary
O'Rourke and her Department sets the policy for Aer Rianta and the policy as it applies to Aer
Rianta in the document that John referred to, Strategic Management Initiative, requires us to
provide the necessary infrastructure and services at the three state airports at the lowest
possible cost, consistent with safe commercial operations, to provide a financial return to the
shareholder which is consistent with the foregoing requirement and to develop traffic at the
three state airports and to exploit new business opportunities, provided they are organically
linked to the company's core business and do not detract from core responsibilities (core
responsibilities being the management of Dublin, Cork and Shannon airports). The aspects of
the policy that I will deal with this morning are the provision of the necessary infrastructure
and in that context, the importance of long-term planning, which has been adopted up until
now. I will also briefly cover charges and the development of traffic at the three airports and I
will make some references if I have time, to overseas business opportunities and funding
issues. I'll start with the planning.
Ireland was very early into aviation and as Dr Fitzgerald mentioned, the terminal at Dublin
Airport built and designed by his brother was built in 1937. Shannon was the gateway to the
west, to the US in the very early days and I think we probably owe it to that that the planning
in Ireland as far as aviation was concerned and the airport was very long term in its nature. For
example in Dublin airport (and I will talk mainly about Dublin airport for the purpose of this
paper), the lands for two parallel runways, each over three thousand metres long were
acquired in the sixties and seventies at a time when traffic at Dublin airport was less than two
million passengers.And these two runways, when built, would provide capacity for
passengersin excessof forty million sothatwas fairly longrange.Thefirst of theserunways
were completed in 1989 and the secondone will be built within the next ten years.
Throughoutthis periodwhich is a periodof over thirty years,approachesto the existingand
proposedrunwayswere kept relatively free from developmentand asa result thereareno
constraintsat presenton futuredevelopmentsin Dublin airport - No restrictionson aircraft
movements,no noise budgetsor curfewsor no noise or cost penalties.Now this can be
contrastedwith manyotherairportsin Europeand furtherafield, wherethereareplenty of
examplesof tightly constrainedairportsitesandoperationalrestrictionsandwe needto beas
far sightedtodayasourpredecessorswerethirty yearsago.And whenI saywe, I meannot
just Aer Rianta,I also includethe Departmentof Public Enterprise,the IAA and the local
planningauthorities.It's alsomostimportantthatplansfor futuregrowthanddevelopmentbe
formulatedin consultationwith the localcommunities.By the endof this yearwe will have
completedthemasterplanfor Dublin airportfor thenexttwentyyearsandthekeyoutstanding
issuesstill to be addressedin that plan will be the exact commencementdate for the
constructionof the secondparallel runway;the future of the existing cross-runwayandthe
next phaseof terminal developmentto cater for passengersin excessof twenty million
passengers.This yearwe will haveoverelevenmillion passengersat Dublin airport.You can
look at theprovisionof infrastructuralcapacityat airportsunderthreeheadings.Onewouldbe
the airfield capacity including the runways,taxi ways and aprons.Secondwould be the
terminalcapacitywhich includescheckin desks,gateloungesandbaggageholdsandthethird
would be surfaceaccessto the airportsincludingearparks.The existing airfield capacityis
morethanadequatefor presentandfutureneeds.Ouronly worry in thisregardwouldbeabad
planningpositionwhich would restrictfurtherexpansion.We would alsobeconcernedabout
thedevelopmentof housingin approachesto therunwayswhich couldcauseproblemsin the
future.With regardto terminalcapacity,we areexperiencingsome congestion at check-in and
in the baggage hold at peak periods. We don't have a problem on the airside. We have a new
Pier C, an expanded Pier A, an expanded Terminal West, new boarding gates in the old
central terminal building. The building that Dr Fitzgerald referred to, is back now in
operation. Construction has started on Pier C phase two, which will be completed by the end
of 1999 and work has also commenced on expanding the terminal to in effect, double it in
size. If you go through Dublin airport you will see a big hole in the ground which is the
beginning of that project. The fourth, the construction of a fourth pier is also proposed. And
this will bring the terminal capacity levels to in excess of twenty million passengers by the
end of the year 2000. We have followed the original planning concept which provided for
phased development of the existing site, based on a single terminal with piers and it's
interesting if you look at the 1968 annual report, for Aer Rianta. There is a scheme in that
which more or less reflects what we are about to do in the next few years and we still believe
that the single terminal concept is the ideal model for airports because there's no confusion
with different terminals. No problems with transferring from one terminal to another, either
for passengers or baggage. It's excellent for hub development and economically efficient to
operate and of course, lower cost to the users. Anyone who has had to transfer from terminal
one to terminal four at Heathrow will know what I mean. Single terminal airports such as
Schipol, Dusseldorf or Copenhagen are much easier than Heathrow or JFK, examples of how
not to do it, from our point of view. There have been a number of suggestions recently and
this is why I'm mentioning the single terminal idea, regarding the concept of competing
terminals and it is frequently referred to in the media. From our experience, where second
terminals are built, they are built exclusively for capacity reasons and even where private or
extemal funding is used, it's just that the airport authority doesn't have the funds itself and
again it's not for competition. There are some models that are referred to, such as Brussels and
Toronto and even Birmingham. But these models have either been reversed or are in the
process of being reversed. I don't know how terminals could, in any practical way, compete.
Ignoring the operational difficulties, at the very least it would require excess capacity in both
terminals, another duplication which could only result in higher costs rather than lower costs
to the user. So from a policy point of view, it's Aer Rianta's intention to continue to develop
terminal facilities at Dublin to the maximum extent as a single terminal facility. Much of what
you would say about single terminals also applies to single airports in a city. Tom Haughey in
a paper given in another session at this symposium has already addressed the general issue of
competition. I don't intend to go further into this aspect. I do believe however the airport
should be subject to regulation and I welcome John Lumsden's remarks about setting up a
formal regulatory framework. Probably the most important issue facing Dublin airport and
indeed Shannon airport is surface access and this will be a very important aspect for us in the
next planning phase. Even if we have the capacity on the airfield and in the terminal for over
twenty million passengers, we still have to get them into the airport and it's very important in
this context that the motorway, the M 1 North proceeds as quickly as possible because this will
take two thirds of the road traffic away from the airport. This traffic is going to Belfast and
Swordsand otherplacesnorth of Dublin airport. Carparking is a major issue.We already
haveeighteenthousandcarparkspacesat Dublin airport.Theequivalentof eightyfive acres,
coveredby carsand that's growing. The car traffic is growing quicker than the passenger
traffic which is alreadygrowingin doubledigit figures.Weprobablycontributeto this growth
ourselvesbecauseour carparkingchargesin the longterm carparkarejust IR£12 aweekor
lessthanIR£1.72perdayandwehaveto look atthat in managingthedemandfor carparking
spaces.We would also welcome the developmentof public transport to Dublin airport
including the LUAS (the light rail system)and of coursebusandcoachservicesandin the
longer term, a direct rail link. We have recentlywritten to the Minister askingher to give
priority to the LUAS line from Broadstoneto the airport.With regardto traffic development,
we've investedvery heavily in traffic developmentat all threeairportsin the past five years
and in the light of the rapid growth in the economy,it's likely that therewould havebeen
growthat the airports anyway. Particularly at Dublin airport but with the kind of growth we
have at Dublin airport we no longer see the need for a growth incentive scheme and we will be
discontinuing any new growth incentive scheme in Dublin airport from the first of January
next year. We will have growth discount schemes at Shannon and Cork airports. We support
regional development and we welcome the Department's recent review of the transatlantic
policy and it's reaffirmation of Shannon's status as a designated gateway. As a measure of our
confidence in the future growth of Shannon we are about to embark on the construction of a
modem unified terminal at Shannon airport and Cork airport will also benefit from a widening
of the runway and the runway overlay and extensions to the terminal and apron and car parks
and a new freight terminal. Cork is also an important regional gateway and has achieved high
growth over the past decade. It is expected that this growth momentum will be contained and
the corporate policies to support the continued rapid growth of Cork airport also. With regard
to airport charges, there's a lot of controversy about that as John already mentioned. But
airport charges only account for 16% of Aer Rianta's revenue which by any standards is
extremely low. We're involved in the business of looking at airports overseas from the point
of view of investing and we do not come across any airports where the aviation revenue is less
than say even 30% or, it's more likely closer to 40-50%; but in Aer Rianta it's just 16% and
we've been able to do that by freezing our charges since 1987 and of course, subsidising it by
our revenue from duty free. Duty free sales which is now under threat and this has a particular
impact on Aer Rianta airports because we're very good at duty free and most of our traffic is
intra-EU, so in that context, we will be looking at the charges. We won't have a knee jerk
reactionto just solvingourproblemsby lookingfor an increasein chargesbut thechargesare
alarminglylow andevenif therewasn'ta threatfrom dutyfree,I think that thechargeswould
needto belookedat.
Lastly I'll just mention that we have significant opportunities overseas. We have recently
invested in the ownership of Birmingham and Dusseldorf and all of this has been funded by
our activities overseas. It hasn't come from the home airports and we see it as important to
balance these airport type investments with duty free. Airport investments are capital
intensive, duty free activities have relatively moderate capital requirements and provide high
cash flow. Just on the legislation, we now own the airports, we're no longer the agent for the
Minister, we don't have significant cash reserves. We haven't been able to build up cash
reserves in the past. We've a major capital programme at the three airports. Three hundred
million pounds and the only way we can fund that is from borrowings and future earnings. We
have also these many opportunities overseas and particularly from the privatisation of airports
and we're currently looking at ways of funding those opportunities within our wholly owned
subsidiary Aer Rianta International. Thank you.
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Thank you Chairman and good morning ladies and gentlemen. Dr Fitzgerald referred to his
links with Aer Lingus and I had the pleasure when I joined the planning department to be
occupying the desk that was previously occupied by Doctor Fitzgerald which was an honour.
I'm also delighted to see my former boss, Antoin Daltun is in the audience for today. It is my
pleasure to have the opportunity to give a view on Ireland's developing air transport policy
from the perspective of Aer Lingus, a medium sized state owned airline. I'm particularly
pleased to be asked to participate at such an auspicious conference as this one is because a few
years ago you would have been forgiven for striking Aer Lingus executives off your invitation
list. My company was in serious trouble in 1990, early 1990's and in fact in 1993, we lost
IR£191 million and had the year end debt of IR£335 million which is some achievement for a
company the size of Aer Lingus but happily we've come a long way from the situation we
actually faced then. There were a number of reasons we found ourselves in that position. The
core air transport business was loss making and it was struggling with the adjustment to the
start up era of increased liberalisation and deregulation and the industry itself was
experiencing a general down turn. Added to that our investment in a number of ancillary
businesses also suffered. In fact, what was meant to be counter-cyclical investments actually
exacerbated the swings in our business cycle and then of course we faced the immediate
impact of the Gulf War which almost stopped US leisure travel to Ireland dead. Added to that
just to complete the tail of sorrow, we had a major investment in Guinness Peat Aviation,
GPA, which collapsed at that time. So literally, our company's back was to the wall but with
the support of the share holder, the Irish Government and in consultation with our staff who
understood that tough action was called for in the long term interest of the company and
themselves, we devised a recovery strategy followed by a long term strategy for profitable
growth. But first obviously the priority was survival. A major cost reduction programme was
launched as one of four steps necessary to bring the airline back into profitability. What we
did first was to put a cost saving programme in place and we managed to save about IR£50
million andreducedthework forcebytwelvehundred.Wedivestedourselvesof thenon-core
businesses.In factwe startedthe processthenandwehavealmostcompletedtheprocessof
divestingourselvesof non-coreactivitiesandthegovernmentcameto oursupportin two very
particularways.Firstly wereceivedacashinjectionofa IR£175million. The company was at
that time grossly under capitalised. In addition, a regularity change was agreed between the
Irish and US governments which enabled carders on the North Atlantic to offer services to
both Shannon and Dublin airports. Previous to that Shannon was the designated transatlantic
airport for Ireland. So assisted by a major restructuring programme and by the boom in the
Irish economy in recent years and also recovery in air transport generally, Aer Lingus has
performed well since 1993. We've had three years of growing profits and this year is also a
good year. But we are all very clear and very conscious of the fact that we need to do a lot
better in order to sustain continued prosperity and also to be, let's face it, to be adequately
prepared for the inevitable down turn which will come in the industry. The company I suppose
is one that operated reasonably well in a protected regulatory environment. It operated very
well I might say. We made steady profits for many years but we were clearly ill prepared for
the extent and the depth of change which we faced and the reason I'm giving you that brief
history is by way of background and how we view working under Irish aviation policy now
and in the immediate future and looking at this I suppose from the perspective of a long
serving and at times long suffering airline executive who's experience of managing in both
eras. But I'm very clear in which environment I prefer to work in and do business in. Now in
Aer Lingus there's a certain vibrancy and a fast growing commercial ethos in the company.
There's a belief in our business direction and in our product and in our service. The
transformation that is currently taking place is due to the, in the first instance the continued
commitment of our staff but we're also greatly benefiting from the open aviation policy of this
country and the emerging role that our owners see for Aer Lingus. The state relationship with
Aer Lingus impacts in three ways. It acts as a policy maker for our industry; it is our
shareholder and the state owns ninety five percent of the shares in Aer Lingus and
traditionally it was the regulator of the airline business. Now the European Commission looks
atter the internal market of the EU but the government still plays a major role for instance in
Ireland-US bilateral matters. Balancing these three roles can be tricky and I know the
Department is continually reviewing how it can best exercise these three vital functions but it
is government policy to facilitate and encourage a wide range of regular and competitive air
services in and out of Ireland and additionally, and this is of particular interest to Aer Lingus,
it seeksto maintainat leastone domestically based and financially viable airline of sufficient
scale to provide air services between Ireland and all our main export markets on a year round
basis. Thereby spelling out it's encouragement for both an open, competitive environment but
also the desire to have at least one domestic player providing a comprehensive service to all
sectors. We see Aer Lingus through its positioning as a full service airline with its own
network covering Europe and the United States, across all markets critical to Ireland. We seek
to fulfil this role as we develop our business strategy going forward and we do this also
having regard to the specific mandate that the government sets for Aer Lingus. The mandate
covers the three areas, and requires that we operate within strict commercial criteria, that we
ensure that how we run our business benchmarks favourably with best in business and, we
also have a mandate to produce, or submit proposals to the shareholder evaluating the
possibilities ofAer Lingus entering into any major strategic alliance, with or without a transfer
of equity. Accordingly, as we develop our own business and our own strategy going forward,
there are three distinct but inter related strands. Firstly, the determination of our market
positioning. That was very important. We needed to take stock of it in the early nineties and
say what does Aer Lingus stand for and what future has it got in the market, particularly in a
market that's changing and is changing so quickly. In the current environment obviously,
some airlines are focusing on low cost, no frills operations. Others are facing the future as a
full service value added carder, with a strong customer service ethos. Allied to this
positioning is the likely direction, either to be a stand alone niche operation or to be a global
player. We have nailed our colours to the full service mast, believing that travel experience for
business and leisure customers alike, can still revolve around quality of service and good
value. I firmly believe and we are increasingly proving that there is a market for this product,
delivered well and delivered consistently. Accordingly what we've done over the last couple
of years is to invest very heavily in our brand. We've launched a new corporate identity, we
have refocused our brand values, bringing back emphasis on core attributes of
professionalism, intuition and intimacy. We face major IT investments in the area of revenue
and yield management, in the whole area of ticketless travel, automated boarding, developing
a new customer database, so there's major, heavy investment going on in the IT side of the
company now. We've introduced new aircraft to the fleet. We've recently taken delivery of
eight A321s for our London routes and will shortly be bringing eight A320s in for our
mainland European operations. We're also changing our commuter operation to all-jet
services and we are experiencing significant competitive success on the key UK routes which
againis showingthereare two markets there. There's a market for the lowest price, no frills.
There's also a market for a carrier that is selling the value message. But our biggest
transformation has been on the North Atlantic and we've really enjoyed very good success on
the North Atlantic. We've grown from three A330s, to seven this winter. We've doubled the
number of gateways, adding Chicago and Newark to JFK and to Boston and we're looking at
additional gateway opportunities. In fact on the North Atlantic over three years we've actually
increased our peak schedule by fifty percent and the off peak winter schedule by three hundred
percent and passenger numbers have almost doubled in this period, so it really has been a
period of significant growth and also a growth in profits I'm happy to say. What we're doing
is basically adding up the one thing that is at the core of our thinking and this is the message
that we're getting out to our customers or potential customers, that what we are offering is
value. And despite the high profile of the low price, no frills proposition, I believe there's still
much mileage in the value equation. Now we're achieving the improvements we made to date
and particularly coming back to 1993, none of this would have been possible without the full
involvement and commitment of the staff in Aer Lingus and it is the same level of staff
commitment, it's with that level of staff commitment that we're pursuing the second strand of
our strategy which is to ensure that we run our business in the most efficient manner possible
and that we benchmark favourably with any competitor. So what we've done is we've
launched a partnership programme with out trade unions and staff which is committed to
reviewing fundamentally how we do our business right across the company and seeking to
identify and implement the maximum efficiencies possible. You can take it for granted in a
sixty year old company that there are many work practices and organisational structures in
place that maybe were appropriate for the 1960s, but are not appropriate for the 1990s. Now
we made progress as I say back in '93 but we have set ourselves a target now of taking an
additional fifty million pounds in costs out of the company over the next three to four years.
It's imperative that we deliver that and we obviously will be looking also to get value from
our suppliers and I was listening with keen interest to what John was saying about charges in
Dublin Airport and also about what he was thinking of doing with incentive schemes. But
we'll have plenty of time to discuss that at another date. But this whole trend towards global
consolidation. This is the third strand if you like to our strategy. Our owner obviously, and
John Lumsden has made reference to it, has mandated us to examine the opportunities open to
Aer Lingus in terms of global alliances and partnership opportunities. Personally I believe that
we need to join a major strategic alliance grouping in order to secure and enhance the
competitiveposition of Aer Lingus going forward. Currentlywe have a numberof route
specifictacticalalliancesbut wedon't haveanexclusiveagreementwith anymajor carderor
groupof carders.I think membershipof sucha groupingbringswith it, it obviously brings
with it a joint ventureapproachto networkdevelopment,facilities, operations,co-ordinating
capacityand service.And I think also and obviously we would need to manage this with
extreme care because we are a small carder but what we would be seeking to do is to enjoy
the benefits of a global brand while protecting our own brand and if we achieve that and do it
right I think it will ensure the future success of Aer Lingus, particularly in the North American
market, it's very important. It also, linking back it enables us to comprehensively fulfil the
role of a carrier best suited to meet the diverse needs of Irish tourism and business. Albeit not
entirely with our own resources but through being able to make a global alliance offering. To
balance all these change factors and all the issues that we're trying to handle in Aer Lingus at
the moment, we've launched both for the external audience and internally what we call a
programme for a better airline. In essence this is a long term umbrella communication
programme covering all aspects of the changes and the improvements that we're seeking to
make. Looking to the future of the business in general, the changes that took place in the last
ten years, certainly were more rapid and more profound than in the previous thirty but I think
we are, what we have experienced may eventually when we look back be seen as a small
change compared with what's going to happen over the next ten years or even five years. I
think it is very likely that our industry is going to change fundamentally particularly within
Europe. I mean the completion of the ongoing regulatory process and the onset of open skies
obviously is going to drive further change through. I mean things have already changed
beyond recognition among many of the European carders and there are winners and losers
among the older airlines and some will successfully restructure themselves. Some are
emerging badly bruised and uncertain over their future and some will go out of business. What
strategy and what direction is decided for Aer Lingus, whatever it is, we will approach it from
a position of confidence. We face immediate challenges, obviously with the introduction of
the Euro, the handling of year 2000, these are things you have to keep a focus on as well as
doing the day to day business. But I don't see any one particular step such as the prospect of
joining a global alliance as a panacea to cover all the structural ills of the industry and of the
business. I mean the balance of load factors, yields, unit cost, will remain as delicate as ever
and you know just continued concentration on unit cost in the airline is absolutely essential.
We can't, no matter what good revenue returns we might be getting at the moment, we can't
takeoureyeoff that.We havea clearcommercialview on theprofit targetslooking forward
but we also have a clear customer focus and we have a strategy that we think will work for
Aer Lingus and will create a better airline in the only alliance that really matters which is
ultimately the alliance with our customers. I also know we have the support of the government
in this pursuit but it is support in a form that is appropriate for now and in the future, not as it
was in the past. I'd like to just sum up my views on how I think Aer Lingus will respond to
the future in a deregulated future by recounting a story told by the late President Eisenhower
about a passenger in a cab in Washington. As the cab was passing the National Archive
building, he noticed a motto carved in stone which said, 'What has passed is prologue'.
Knowing that taxi drivers the world over know everything, the passenger asked the driver
what this meant and he replied, 'that's just bureaucrat speak. It means you ain't seen nothing
yet.'
Thanks for inviting me along and good luck with the rest of your conference.
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Reflections on the European Aviation Industry
In my younger days I am sure that if I had been invited to deliver a paper to an
august symposium such as this, I would have selected a more ambitious title such as
"The Future of European Air Transport in the 21st Century". Today however, I am
less brash and certainly less ambitious. Thirty six years of association with this
industry has thought me a degree of humility and an awareness of my own fallibility
(as well as that ofrnost commentators) in predicting the future of European air
transport.
Accordingly I have titled this brief paper "Reflection on the European Air Transport
Industry". What I intend to do is to identify some of the important themes or driving
factors in the industry today, to try to understand their importance in the overall
scheme and speculate briefly as to how they might develop in the future.
These themes are as follows:
1. Basics of Success
2. Industry Profitability
3. Alliances
4. Government Regulation
5. CRS's
6. Airports
7. Fuel
1. Basics of Success
Let me start with a very simple proposition. The really basic elements in this
industry, the determinants wh/ch lead to success or failure are substantially the same
as they have been in the past and are likely to remain the same in the future. The
product has to be safe and it has to be reliable. Reliable means not having undue
levels of delays or cancellations, no lost baggage, no excessive queuing at airports,
courteous and professional staff, reasonably comfortable sealing on aircraft and
cleanand well kept facilities. All of these have to be provided at prices, which are
affordable in the context of the different market segments, which are being served.
These are the basics which are necessary but not sufficient conditions for success.
Beyond them the most important factors again remain what they have always been,
namely where do you .fly and what equipment do you use.
I make these fairly obvious points firstly because they are often forgotten and
secondly because I believe that many of the other topics addressed by industry
commentators, including the interesting subjects on the agenda of this symposium,
are only relevant in so far as they contribute to the basics needed for success. Their
relevance therefore has to be assessed on the basis of whether or not they contribute
to the fundamental driving forces of the industry.
It is important to remember that even though aviation is now a fairly mature
industry it is not always easy to get the basics right. However it is important to get
them right most if not all of the time. It is also important to remember that this is an
industry which in spite of its high-tech image, its increasing global nature and its
highly sophisticated computer modeling techniques is offering a fairly simple and
uncomplicated product. The most successful players have been and will continue to
be those who do the basics best.
2. Industry profitability
These are heady days for the airlines. After disastrous losses in 1992 and 1993 in the
aftermath of the Gulf War, the combination of low fuel prices and growing
economies in the developed world, combined with a reasonable balance between
supply and demand in most markets led to near record net profits for the
international industry of US$5bn in 1997. The last three years taken together have
been the most profitable period in the history of aviation.
Looking forward, the outlook for the industry as a whole appears positive but there
are a number of warning signs that should be noted before we all rush out to buy
airline stock. In the first place, the net profit of U_Sbn in 1997 represented only 3.4%
of total revenues. Even within the more profitable US domestic industry the top
industry performers find it difficult to better a 6% margin. Secondly, the financial
crisis in the Asian Pacific foreign exchange and capital markets is having a ripple
effect on the industry worldwide. IATA has recently estimated that the impact on
airlines operating to, from and within the region is expected to be a reduction of net
profit of the order of US$2bn. Thirdly, a major contributor to the improved financial
results of the industry has been the achievement of a reasonable degree of stability
between capacity and demand which is pushing load factors to record levels in most
markets. Historically, airline managements have always ordered too much
equipment in the good days and suffered severe consequences when economies
turned down. It would be a surprising change in human nature if this pattern were
never to be repeated in the future! Fourthly, it is important to remember that current
profits are being achieved on the back of the lowest real fuel prices in the history of
the industry. I will return to this point later.
3. Alliances
This is the current hot subject in the industry about which all commentators are
writing with great excitement. A recent article in "Airline Business" (June 1998)
identified a total of 502 alliances in the industry, an increase of 38 % over the number
measured last year. Some 11% of the total involved equity investment in some form
or another. There are now four major global groupings (including the proposed
AA/BA alliance) whose combined group revenues range between approximately
US$30bn and US$70bn annually.
I am surprised by the unthinking assumption by many industry commentators that
these alliances are necessarily "a good thing". In fact I would go further and say that
in many cases they represent a bit of a confidence trick on the unsuspecting public.
They do offer some limited scope for cost saving within the airline industry itself
(e.g. increased purchasing power, elimination of some overhead duplication) but in
general they are a zero sum game for the industry collectively. Their main purpose
often is to find a way around merger controls and gain an edge over the competition.
There have been different perspectives on alliances in the United States and Europe.
Up till fairly recently US Government regulators have been relatively relaxed about
the competitive issues and indeed have encouraged code sharing alliances as a carrot
in a number of instances to persuade European Governments to accept open skies.
This has even allowed some carriers to undertake what is euphem/sticaUy known as
"schedule and fare co-ordination", practices which could perhaps more openly be
described as capacity and price fixing. I see little difference between this and the
former pooling arrangements introduced by Governments at a time when the
industry was in its early stages. Such practices became substantially discredited over
time but now appear to be re-emerging under different names.
Given the United States concern with anti-trust behaviour in business generally and
the much more relaxed view historically taken in Europe about cartels, it is
somewhat ironic that the European Commission today appears much more vigilant
and concerned about the possibility of anti-competitive behavior and abuses of
dominant positions than the US regulators. The detailed investigation of the
proposed AA/BA Alliance is the most recent example, but back as far as 1987 the
Commission intervened vigorously in the proposed take-over of British Caledonian
by British Airways and imposed a number of restrictions which were not to the
liking of British Airways or indeed the British Government.
The two year investigation of AA/BA by the Commission has led to the adoption of
a preliminary position published earlier this month proposing a number of
conditions in respect of the proposed alliance, namely reductions in frequencies,
abolition Of 267 slots without compensation and as yet unidentified restrictions on
frequent flyer programmes, CRS displays, relations with travel agents and corporate
customers and interlining. The offidal Commission statement went on as follows: -
"The Commission considers that, without the proposed conditions, the
implementation of the agreement would amount to an abuse of the parties'
dominant position on hub-to-hub routes, contrary to Article 86 of the EC Treaty. The
Commission also considers that the BA/AA agreement restricts competition
contrary to Article 85 of the EC Treaty. The key competition concerns of the
Commission are the reinforcement of BA/AA's dominant position on three hub-to-
hub routes and the significant barriers to entry that would be created by the
alliance."
However, the US airlines have recently been pushing the concept of airlines
domestically to a point that is now getting serious attention from politicians and
regulators. This year the six largest airlines in the United States have announced
their intention of get_g together in three separate alliance groupings as follows: -
American Airlines/US Airways, Northwest/Continental and United/Delta. Viewed
at national level this represents a serious concentration of power in the industry.
Viewed regionally the picture is even starker. For example, using the US Department
of Transportation figures for the first quarter of 1998, two of these groupings would
control between them the following market percentages in each of the following
regional markets: -
East 65%
_vimwest 74%
South 80%
Southeast 84%
A submission by the General Accounting Office to the US Sub-Committee on
Aviation in ]une 1998 estimated that if all three alliances occurred, competition
would be potentially reduced for about 100 million of the 396 million domestic
passengers per year. There would be a partial offset by potential benefits to about 30
million other passengers on routes where two alliance partners could combine to
compete with other airlines. The likelihood is that if these alliances were all
approved in their present form (which has now to be highly unlikely) frequencies
would fall and fares rise on a significant number of US domestic routes.
The proponents of the argument that alliances are generally in the public interest
argue some of the following benefits:
• Competitive benefits from multiple competing options
• Seamless on-line service
• Simpler check-in
• Sharing of airport lounges
• Merging of frequent flier programmes.
The argument that there will be competitive benefits from multiple competing
options is highly questiormable; it is much easier to argue that there will be fewer
competing options. The other proposed benefits are generally already available or
readily achievable under the existing system. After all, interlining agreements have
been part of the industry for many years and have worked pretty effectively in the
interests of the consumer. Code-sharing could be described as a form of
misrepresentation for a passenger who believes, for example, that he has bought a
ticket on Lufthansa and finds out that he ends up on an SAS flight.
There are also many practical problems for the airlines themselves. At a
fundamental marketing level what brand image is being projected? Will Air Canada
be marketing the Air Canada brand or the Star Alliance brand? Could a smaller
airline such as Aer Lingus entering into a partnership with, for example, British
Airways seriously expect to be treated as an equal? Achieving serious marketing
integration demands a degree of aligmnent between, for example, respective
revenue management systems but this will demand a lot of resources and consume
considerable time. Given the degree of promiscuity in the industry in moving from
one partner to another and the divorce rate among allegedly permanent partners can
such long-term investments be justified? Finally, how do you explain to a British
Airways employee that a long-term alliance is essential with a US domestic partner
given that the chosen partner was originally United Airlines, then US Airways, then
American Airlines and now perhaps US Airways again?
None of the above is intended to suggest that industry consolidation already taking
place in the United States will not also occur in Europe or that global alliances are
not here to stay. However such consolidation is likely to be complex and fluid and
hopefully will continue to be monitored very closely by the European Commission.
Such statements as that recently attributed to a senior Lufthansa official to the effec_
that in future they would tend to confine interlining to members of their own
alliance will hardly go unchallenged. The history of strategic alliances in other
industries shows many examples of false starts and outright failures as well as
successes and aviation is already showing a similar pattern.
4. Regulation
Alliances are not the only area where European regulators are likely to be vigilant to
ensure fair competition. The availability of slots at major airport hubs for new
entrants in order to prevent dominance of feed traffic by the major operators needs
to be an important item on their agenda. The Commission has taken a strong view
in a number of cases, (not only with airlines), about alleged abuses of dominant
positions causing barriers to entry. For example, Aer Lingus was fined in the early
1990's for refusing to exchange tickets with British Midlands when they commenced
services between Dublin and London Heathrow.
At a more general level, regulators in the United States and Europe continue to have
somewhat differing approaches to competitive issues and this will need to be
addressed. Out United States friends have not been slow in the past to claim extra -
territorial jurisdiction for their ant/-trust competition laws and there is a lot of scope
for serious misunderstanding and disagreement if a more harmonised approach to
regulation cannot be achieved.
On a local issue I would express the hope that the current restrictions on Atlantic
services to and from Dublin, which have been partially eased in recent years, will
soon be lifted totally. The original policy was introduced to protect Shannon Airport
but led to severe distortion of the market and cost Aer Lingus many millions of
pounds over the years in traffic diverted over London. Although the current policy
does allow direct non-stop operations from Dublin to the United States, at least 50 %
of the services offered by carriers have to be to and from Shannon. At present there
is at least one major US carrier that is deterred from giving serious consideration to
providing regular services to Dublin by this restraint. Continuation of this policy
would eliminate any possibility of developing Dublin Airport further as an
international hub.
competitive advantage in the years ahead and possibly even allow it over time to
challenge Heathrow as the main international airport in Europe.
7. Fuel
I have already referred to the crucial importance of low fuel prices as a factor in the
current profitability of the aviation industry. However, in looking down through the
agenda for this symposium, I was struck by the absence of any reference to it. It
reminded me of the importance of the dog in the Sherlock Holmes story about
whom the significant fact was that he did not bark!
The three major crises of the last 25 years in aviation in 1974, 1980 and 1991 were all
precipitated by a sharp and unpredicted increase in fuel prices. Depending on route
structure, fuel prices today generally comprise approximately 15% of an airline's
total expenditure .In those three crisis years and the years immediately following,
that figure went up in many cases to 25% or even 30%. The consequences of that on
an industry with profit margins ranging between 0% and 6% were indeed profound.
The pundits today believe that one can reasonably plan for the continuation of low
fuel prices. This is probably correct as a short to medium term assessment but it
ignores the possibility of major political upheavals. Those of us who experienced at
first hand the traumas of previous fuel price increases of 100% and 200% will
remember that previous commentators did not forecast the Yom Kippur War of 1973,
the fall of the Shah of Iran in 1979 or the invasion of Kuwait in 1990.
Harold MacMillan once commented that the real dread of politicians was 'Events,
dear boy, events'! In looking ahead we tend to assume stability and disregard the
possibility of sharp discontinuities. If we do in some form or another have a replay
of history especially in the Middle East, then I would suggest that many, if not all, of
the papers prepared for this symposium (including this contribution) will be of little
value as a guide to the future of aviation in Europe in the new millennium.
Benchmark Airport Charges
A. de Wit, Directorate General Civil Aviation (DGCA) 1
N. Cohn, Hague Consulting Group (HCG) 2
1. Introduction
1.1 Objectives
The Netherlands Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) commissioned Hague
Consulting Group to complete a benchmark study of airport charges at 28 airports in Europe
and around the world, based on 1996 charges. This study followed previous DGCA research on
the topic but included more airports in much more detail. The mare purpose of this new
benchmark study was to provide insight into the levels and types of airport charges worldwide
and into recent changes m airport charge policy and structure.
The 1996 Benchmark Airport Charges study was completed for a selection of important
passenger and freight airports and included a wide variety of aircraft types. Airport charges as
of July 15, 1996 were calculated for each aircraR type at each airport 3, based on one landing
and one take-off from/to an international airport by a non-domestic carrier (one international
turnaround). The calculations were performed using the 'Airport Charges Model" (ACM),
which was developed for DGCA.
The 1996 stud)" does not include handling or fuel charges. DGCA and HCG intend to include
these charges in a 1997 update.
The 1996 Benchmark Airport Charges report _s used by DGCA for:
• gaming insight into the competitive position of Schiphol m terms of airport charges;
• verification of the findings of other research into Schiphol's competitive position, both for
parliamentary questions and as input for an international comparison of infrastructure;
• data input for research projects carried out by DGCA and other organisations;
• insight into the ways m which airports and governments in different countries include the
environmental costs of aviation activities in their charging systems;
• background information for the revision of charges at Schiphol.
This paper describes the 1996 analysis. More detail regarding input data and assumptions, as
well as a comparison between 1995 and 1996 daytime airport charges in Europe, may be found
in the DGCA publication ' Benchmark of Airport Charges 1996'. It is intended that this work
be repeated ever 3, year in order to follow developing trends and provide the most up-to-date
information possible.
P.O. Box 90771, 2509 LT The Hague, Netherlands.
-"Surinamestraat 4, 2585 GJ The Hague, Netherlands.
3 A small number of exceptions were made for airports with seasonal peak charges.
1.2 Background
The importance of determining and tracking airport charges across different airports has been
made clear by recent developments in aviation:
• Due to the stiff competition in the aviation sector, airlines are constantly looking for ways
of minimising costs. This includes minimising costs that are to a limited extent under the
direct control of airlines, such as airport turnaround costs. The annual ICAO report,
"Financial Data", contains information about the cost structure of a number of airlines.
According to this source, airport charges make up about 5% of the costs of large,
international airlines. For smaller, short-haul airlines the percentage can be as much as
s5O/o
• The costs of negative externalities related to the environmental impact of aviation activities
are increasingly being quantified and passed through to the airlines. Fees based on aircraft
noise levels and night flight surcharges are examples of this.
• The phasing-out of a large share of duty-free shopping at many European airports may
affect the structure and level of their airport charges.
The airport charges discussed in this report form only one part of the total turnaround costs at
airports. Including handling costs and fuel costs would make the analysis more complete,
however, at this time, insufficient data are available to DGCA and HCG. Additional research is
required in order to include them in the near future. Current information indicates that total
handling charges are approximately 50% as large as total airport charges, and that fuel costs
amount to more than the sum of airport charges and handling costs 5.
2.0 Airport charges
The ACM processes several different types of airport charges to complete the comparison of
airports and aircraft types. The types of fees included are based primarily on the information
published in the 'IATA Airport and En Route Aviation Charges Manual'. While ICAO also
compiles airport charge information, IATA provides the most recent data. With further
research it may be possible to expand the types of fees included in the ACM calculations, but
at this time the list is limited to the charges described here.
Basic landing fees are usually based on the maximum take-off weight (MTOW). Some
airports charge per tonne while others apply a fixed charge plus a variable charge based on
MTOW. There are a few airports that vary these charges by time of day or season (peak/off-
peak) or by the frequency of a given carrier's operations. Some airports include lighting in the
landing charge.
Noise charges require special attention because they are sometimes complicated to calculate
and are of increasing importance in public and political debates on airport infrastructure. In
this paper, a distinction is made bet_veen noise-related landing charges and other noise
taxes/charges.
4 R. Doganis. 'The Airport Business', 1992, p. 63.
5 1993/1994 handling and fuel costs for a Boeing 747-400 at Amsterdam Airport Schiphol, taken from
"A Comparative Stud}" of User Costs at Selected European Airports', Cranfield University,
Department of Air Transport. College of Aeronautics. February. 1994.
Man), airports have higher landing charges for noisier types of aircraft (Chapter 26 aircra_ for
example). In the ACM, the additional landing charges assessed for these aircraft are calculated
separately from the basic landing charge. For any given aircraft, the basic landing charge is
calculated as the amount to be paid for the cheapest, most advantageous situation (for example
a Chapter 3 aircraft). The noise related landing charge is the difference between this basic
landing charge and the actual landing charge that must be paid for the given aircraft. Several
airports charge an extra tax based on aircraft noise levels that is independent of all landing
charges. In the ACM, these noise taxes or charges are included as a separate category.
In some cases the tariff differentiation is based on airport- or country-specific aircraft acoustic
group classifications (France, Belgium, Switzerland and Korea). At other airports the ICAO
classification is used (i.e. 'Chapter 2', 'Chapter 3').
Passenger charges are usually levied for services provided to departing passengers, although
some airports charge for both departing and arriving passengers. A number of airports charge
lower rates for transfer passengers and infants than for other passengers, while others exempt
these t_13es of passengers from charges completely. Some passenger charges are paid by the
airlines, some by passengers themselves. For the purposes of this analysis, all passenger
charges were included in the calculations as if they are paid by the airlines. This allows for
consistent comparison between airports and avoids any second-guessing about how these
charges are handled by each airline and each airport.
Security service charges are often calculated per departing passenger. In a few cases they are
based on MTOW which is then a proxy for the number of passengers.
Some airports charge specifically for runway lighting charges. These charges usually apply
only to night flights, but may be charged incidentally depending on weather conditions. The
charges are usually made per landing and several airports included in the study incorporate
lighting charges in their landing charges.
Aircraft parking charges are based on the number of hours an aircraft is parked at the airport.
In some instances these charges are also related to aircraft weight or wingspan. Most airports
provide 1 to 4 hours of free parking time, which is usually enough to allow for a complete
turnaround. Others provide free overnight parking or differentiate parking charges by location
at the airport (i.e. remote stands).
Terminal navigation aid charges cover navigational assistance during arrival and departure.
The), are commonly charged per arrival and/or departure and are sometimes based on MTOW.
Aviobridge fees apply to the facilities used for passenger boarding and alighting. In some
cases this is a bus service instead of an aviobridge. These fees could be considered handling
charges, but in this stud), the)"were treated as airport charges.
Cargo charges are usually based on the weight of the loaded or unloaded cargo. Note that the
passenger variants in the ACM do not include any passenger/cargo 'combi' aircraft. The cargo
charges are only included in the ACM cargo variants.
6 As defined by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) in 'Environmental Protection,
Inlernational Standards and Reconunended Practices, Annex 16 to the Convention on International
Civil Aviation. Volume I: Aircraft Noise', Third Edition, 1993.
2.1 Other charges
Fuel costs and handling costs are two important types of airport charges which are not
currently included in the ACM calculations. Details concerning these charges are not reported
by airports with any consistency and are rarely published. Such charges are also very difficult
to generalise across airports and aircraft types because of specific contractual agreements
which often exist between airlines, handlers, fuel vendors and airports. The prices agreed upon
in these contracts can vary a great deal depending on the supplier and the size of the customer.
There are a few other t_es of charges which are also excluded from the analysis because their
interpretation was unclear or because no consistent data were available. These range from fire
fighting service, aircraft cleaning, storage facility use and hangar charges to terminal and
quarantine surcharges.
2. 2 Assumptions
Although a good deal of detailed information is available about airport charges, quite a few
assumptions are required in order to create a complete and consistent picture of these costs over
all airports and aircraft types. These assumptions make comparisons between airports possible.
An effort was made to base these assumptions on the most common or average situation. Three
of the most important assumptions are given here:
• The total number of passengers in an aircraft is equal to the number of seats in the aircraft
multiplied by a load factor of 0.65.
• The number of passengers that are transfer passengers depends on the flight destination and
the aircraft type. For example, intercontinental (ICA) flights usually contain a higher
percentage of passengers that must transfer to reach the final destination airports than
intra-European flights. The same is true for larger aircraft used for longer distances
between major hub airports when compared to smaller aircraft used for shorter distances.
• The number of airport parking hours required for a given flight depends on the flight
destination and aircraft type (full freighter and passenger aircraft).
In each variant, ever3' aircraft type is assigned to a flight destination group. Table 1 shows
how the flight destination group determines the assumed share of transfer passengers and
required parking hours for each aircraft. Only flight operations with international origins or
destinations are included in this analysis. Domestic operations are not included.
Table 1: Transfer passengers and parking hours
flight destination
group
Europe
Europe or ICA
I¢"A
% passengers
transfer
20
30
40
parking hours
1
2
3
In the freight variants, there are two types of freight aircraft which require 5 parking hours
(they are assumed to have longer turnaround times). Also important for the freight variants is
the assumption that the amount of cargo carried is equal to 70% of the maximum payload of
the given freighter.
All airportchargeshavebeencalculatedin termsof Netherlands Guilders. Exchange rates
have been used from July 15, 19967 (for the 1995 variant, July 15, 1995s).
It is important to note that there are significant differences among airports in which types of
charges are levied and in hog' these charges are calculated. Any comparison or analysis
requires interpretation and a number of assumptions. The expertise of a number of persons at
the DGCA, Schiphol Airport and at other airports was essential for the completion of this
report.
3.0 Airport charges model
The Airport Charges Model (ACM), developed for the DGCA, is a flexible program designed
to calculate the airport charges 9 to airlines for a tumaround, based on aircraft type. These
charges can be calculated for any number of airports, limited only by data availability. This
allows for comparison of airport charges among airports and aircraft types. The user can select
the airports, aircraft types and fees which are to be included in the model calculations. The
specification of the formulas for calculating the airport charges can be made for each airport
and, if necessary, for each time period.
The most important data source for this work was the 'IATA Airport and En Route Aviation
Charges Manual'. This source is updated several times per year because airports regularly
change both the levels of the fees charged as well as the charging fomulas. The fees and
formulas in the ACM are based largely on the information contained in this publication. The
charges valid as of July 15, 1996 were used except for calculating charges for airports with
seasonal peak and off-peak periods. In these cases the published rates for each season as of
July 15, 1996 were used. Aside from the IATA manual, many airports and aviation authorities
were contacted directly with specific questions and to verify that the IATA information was
correct and complete. Additional information was provided by DGCA staff, various airport and
civil aviation authorities and the Transportation Office of the Royal Netherlands Embassy,
Washington, DC. The Airport Information Publication (ALP) was also consulted, as were
several other studies of airport charges. The most important of these were:
Airport Charges in Europe, Andre Wrobel, Institute of Air Transport, Paris, 1997 and
User Costs at Airports in Europe, SE Asia and the USA, The Air Transport Group,
Cranfield College of Aeronautics, February 1998.
While it would obviously be preferable to calculate charges based on, say, current 1998 tariffs,
the IATA manual is not updated quickly enough in order to do so. In addition, in many cases it
is necessary to consult airports or civil aviation authorities to clarify specific issues for
individual airports, and this feedback process is quite time-consuming.
4.0 Variants
The variants were designed to provide a picture of the relative competitiveness 0f airports in
each of the following market contexts:
• Europe 1995: da)_ime passenger operations at major European airports
7 Exchange rates were obtained from the Olsen & Associates Currency Converter on Internet.
rates were also checked against rates published in the NRC Handelsblad
Exchange rates obtained from NRC Handelsblad
9 excluding handling and fuel charges.
These
• Europe 1996: daytime passenger operations at major European airports
• Europe Night 1996: night-time passenger operations at major European airports
• Europe Freight 1996: daytime freight operations at major European airports
• Europe Night Freight 1996: night-time freight operations at major European airports
• Regional 1996: daytime passenger operations at regional airports in the Netherlands and a
number of surrounding countries
• World 1996: daytime passenger operations at major airports around the world.
A selection of airports and aircraft types was made for each of these variants. The selection
criteria for the airports to be included in each variant were:
• Europe 1996: European airports with more than 4 million international passengers and
dominated by scheduled air services;
• Europe Night 1996: the same airports as in Europe 1996;
• Europe Freight and Night Freight 1996: the same airports as in Europe 1996 but expanded
to include a few other important freight airports;
• Regional 1996: a number of medium-sized airports were selected in the Netherlands and the
five surrounding countries, as well as the main airports in these countries.
• World 1996: This variant includes some of the largest airports in the world based on
international scheduled passenger volumes. An effort was made to include airports on all
continents.
The selection of aircraft types to be included in the ACM was based on information from the
1996 ABC Guide. The aircraft types most frequently landing at and taking off from the
selected airports in each variant were chosen. Also important was obtaining a mix of large and
small aircraft types as well as both Chapter 3 and Chapter 2 aircraft. In the freight variants, a
mix of the most commonly used freight aircraft was selected.
Table 2 and Table 3 list the airports and aircraft types for each of the 1996 variants. The
Europe 1995 variant is also shown for comparison purposes and because it was revised for this
report based on more recent data.
Many airports vary their charges by time of day or by season. Each time period is included in
the ACM as a separate airport so that clear comparisons can be made. For example, airport
charges at London Gatwick have been calculated three times for the Europe 1996 variant: once
for the peak period, once for the 'shoulder' period and once for the off-peak period. Averaging
the costs across these periods would not allow for realistic comparisons between Gatwick and
other airports. Note that 'peak' and 'off-peak' periods can refer to either time of day or season.
Note also that in the variants Europe Night 1996 and Freight Night 1996, there are fewer
airport entries for which charges are calculated than in the corresponding daytime variants.
This is because certain time periods, such as Athens airport peak period, are not applicable for
night flight charges.
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5.0 Interpretation Issues
Any review of airport charges between airports has inherent comparison and interpretation
problems. While it is clear from section 2 that there are man'*" common elements across airports
in terms of the t39es of charges the), leD, and how they calculate these charges, there are more
exceptions than consistencies. The analysis completed by HCG and DGCA dealt with as many
of these as possible while preserving a comprehensible overview across all the airports and
aircraft t}2_es included. However, there are a number of differences between airports that are
important to consider when making international comparisons of charges.
5.1 U.S. Airports
Section 2 above reviews the types of charges which airlines are required to pay for airport use.
The overall structure of these charges is quite similar at most of the airports included in this
study, but the structure of the airport charges at American airports is quite different. Some of
the charges made at many European airports, such as lighting, security and parking, are not
made at American airports. Likewise, an extra passenger tax is charged for all passengers at
American airports (US$6 per international passenger in 1996) which is not levied at most
European airports. The question is how to include these airports in a comparative study. Some
sources argue that because this passenger tax is eventually reinvested in the U.S. airport and
airspace system (by way of the Airport Improvement Program, or ALP), it should not be
included in the calculation of total charges _°. The reasoning is that the level of airport subsidy
in the U.S is such that the airlines eventually obtain benefits approximately equal to the
additional passenger tax they pay.
There are several other differences between U.S. and European airports that make any
comparison even more difficult:
US. airport operators are involved in fewer activities than many of their European
counterparts, such as handling or air traffic control, and their financial structures in
general are quite different.
Some U.S. airports leD, a passenger facility charge (PFC) which goes directly toward
financing improvements at that airport. Airports that le D, a PFC have their ALP funding
reduced.
At many U.S airports, airlines participate directly by participating in the financing of new
facilities or even by building their ox_la terminals. The financial agreements between
airlines and airports vary a great deal among the U.S. airports.
There are man',' sources of financing for aviation facilities aside from airport bonds, such
as state governments, 'essential services' grants and specific funding for intermodal
facilities.
The aim of this study is to calculate the nominal ('face-value') charges to an airline for an
international turnaround at each airport. The government passenger taxes and any PFCs are
therefore included in the calculations because they are part of the total charges. The analysis of
the financial structure of U.S. or European airports is beyond the scope of this study.
_" "A Comparative Stud) of User Costs at Selected European Airports', Cranfield University,
Department of Air Transport. College of Aeronautics. February. 1994. pp. 17-18.
Furthermore,it is notpossibletomeasurethereturnof this tax to specific airlines at specific
airports.
In order to provide some indication of the relative importance of the government passenger tax,
we have calculated the U.S. 'air transportation tax' separately from other passenger charges. It
is included in the ACM totals but shows its relative share of total charges separately from that
of other passenger charges.
Similar government passenger taxes are charged at British, French and Norwegian airports.
The U.K. tax is not earmarked for specific investment in aviation facilities, but it is also shown
separately in • The French tax, which is referred to as the air transport cross-subsidization
tax l_, is not included in the 1996 ACM calculations because it was not included in the IATA
charges manual. It will be included in the 1997 ACM report. The Norwegian tax is used to
subsidize domestic rail operations, but is not applicable in the ACM since Fornebu is only
included in the freight variants.
5. 2 Other factors
The airport charges contained in this paper are based on published rates from different sources,
in some cases modified or calculated according to additional interpretation provided by airports
and aviation authorities. It is important to note that the actual charges paid by an airline could
differ significantly from the figures shown here. Some negotiation takes place between airlines
and specific (usually smaller) airports that can result in individual agreements and different
charges on a case-by-case basis. As discussed in the section above, direct or indirect subsidies
are not quantified or included in the ACM in any way.
6.0 Results
Some notable results of the 1996 analysis are:
• There are large differences in the composition and calculation of airport charges among the
airports (and sometimes even within the countries) included in this study. Airport charges
in the United States show the biggest difference compared with those at other airports.
• The charges at Schiphol airport are in some cases different in composition than those at
many other airports. The Schiphol charges that are somewhat different from those at many
other airports include lower passenger charges for transfer passengers, landing surcharges
for Chapter 2 aircraft and a specific noise charge (for financing noise insulation costs).
• Approximately one half of the airports included in the ACM variant in which 1996
European airport charges for daytime passenger operations were calculated have no form of
explicit noise charges (noise related landing charges or noise taxes). Of the airports
included in the 1996 world-wide variant, two thirds have no such charges.
• The tables below show the five airports with the highest average charges and the five
airports with the lowest charges for each variant, for all aircraft types and specifically for
Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 aircraft. It is evident from these tables that airports in the UK and
Germany as well as the Vienna and Geneva airports are the most expensive in Europe. The
German airports are not among the five most expensive when only Chapter 3 aircraft are
_ According to the ITA study, 'Airport Charges in Europe', this passenger tax at French airports was
instituted in 1995 and was FRF3 per embarking passenger in 1996 (pp. 40).
considered.HelsinkiandStockholmstandoutasvery expensive for night operations n. On a
worldwide basis, New York JFK and Tokyo Narita have the highest charges, followed by
other US airports, Frankfurt and London Heathrow. When passenger taxes are excluded
from this comparison, London Heathrow appears much less expensive in both its peak and
off-peak periods. The lowest airport charges are found in Southern Europe and, for non-
peak periods, in the UK. The regional airports in Belgium and Luxembourg also have
relatively low average charges. Also notable is the fact that Singapore has low average
charges compared to other large airports around the world.
About half of the airports included in the ACM variants have higher airport charges for
night-time operations than for daytime operations. In most cases, the differences in charges
have to do with lighting, noise and navaid.
Smaller, regional airports do not always have lower charges than large mamports. For
example, the regional airports in the UK, such as London City Airport and East Midlands,
have higher charges than some of the large UK airports.
The turnaround costs of a freighter are as little as one half those for a comparable passenger
aircraft at airports which do not explicitly apply cargo charges. This is largely because
passenger, security and aviobridge charges do not apply. For airports which do have cargo
charges, the total turnaround costs of a freighter are more comparable to those of a
passenger aircraft, depending on aircraft type and the actual cargo rate.
The average change in airport charges between 1995 and 1996 for the airports and aircraft
included in the ACM was between +5% and +9%.
The competitive position of Schiphol is just below the ten most expensive airports and is
comparable with the Paris and Brussels airports (see Table 7: Schiphol rankings in the
ACM variants, below). Schiphol charges for Chapter 2 aircraft are higher than for Chapter
3 aircraft. Between 1995 and 1996 Schiphol became relatively less expensive overall but by
a small margin.
The position of the regional airports in the Netherlands is generally in the medium range
compared to airport charges at other regional airports.
Figure I shows the charges for a daytime turnaround of a B747-400 at 20 _3major intemational
airports, world-wsde In Figure 2, the same charges are shown with the government passenger
taxes split out of the passenger charges for the U.S. and U.K airports. Figure 3 shows charges
for a B737-500 daytime turnaround at 22 European airports, and Figure 4 contains the night-
time charges at these airports for the same aircraft. Figure 5 shows the charges at European
airports for a Chapter 2 aircraft turnaround (DC9-30). Note the sizeable noise-related landing
charges at several airports. Figure 6 is an example of freighter aircraft tumaround charges in
Europe.
t_,The night charges at Helsinki and Stockholm are incorrectly specified in the IATA manual. They
are actually somewhat lower and as a result are overestimated in this stud)'. The 1997 study _ill
rectify this problem.
_3The ACM calculates charges separately for peak and off-peak periods if specified at a given airport.
In such cases, the airport appears more than once in the figures, i.e. 'LHRP" and "LHRO'.
7.0 Recommendations for further research
This paper contains a thorough and highly detailed inventory and comparison of standard
airport charges within Europe and throughout the world. The market positions of a wide variety
of airports in different contexts can be seen in terms of these airport charges. However, an
analysis of airport charges alone does not provide a complete picture of either the costs faced
by airlines when using a given airport, or the overall competitive position of that airport. In
particular, the costs of fuel and handling are significant and probably at least as important to
airlines as airport charges. These and possibly other costs should be further researched and in
some form included in the ACM in order to provide a more complete comparison of the costs to
airlines of using Schiphol with other airports. This will not be a simple task due to lack of data
and the complexity of contracts and agreements between airlines, airports, handling companies
and fuel companies.
Table 4: Airports with the highest and lowest average total charges across all aircraft types
included in the ACM variants
Highest Europe
1996
5
lowest
1
2
3
4
5
Europe 1995
Heathrow
Peak
Manchester
peak
Frankfurt
Vienna
Dusseldorf
Rome
Milan Linate
Madrid
Madrid peak
Dublin
Europe
Night1996
Hcathrow Helsinki
Peak
Vienna Frankfurt
Manchester Manchester
peak peak
Frankfurt Dusseldorf
Dusseldorf Vienn.._...__La
Rome Madrid
Milan Rome
Linate
Madrid Milan
Linate
Madrid Dublin
peak
Dublin Lisbon low
Freight
1996
Dusseldorf
Cologne
Frankfurt
Munich
peak
Athens
peak
Gatwick
off-peak
Gatwick
shoulder
Stansted
off-peak
Night
Freight
1996
Helsinki
Cologne
Dusseldorf
Stockholm
Frankfurt
Athens off-
peak
Athens
Peak
Gatwick
off-peak
Gatwick
shoulder
Stansted
off-peak
Regional
1996
worlo l_o
London JFK
city peak
London Tokyo Narita
City off-
p_
East ChJe_go
Midlands
p_
East Heathrow
Midlands peak
Belfast Frankfurt
Mexico City
'A'
Liege Singapore
Charleroi Mexico City
'B'
Ostende Jnhannesburg
St_o_ S_ul
Table 5: Airports with the highest and lowest average total charges for Chapter 3 aircraft
included in the ACM variants
l_tghest
lowest
Europe 1995
Heathrow
Peak
Manchester
Vienna
Gatwick
peak
Manchester
off-peak
Rome
Milan Linate
Madrid
Madrid peak
Dublin
Europe
1996
Heathrow
Peak
Vienna
Mancheste
r peak
Mancheste
r off-peak
Gatwick
peak
Rome
Milan
Linate
Madrid
Madrid
peak
Dublin
Europe
Night 1996
Helsinki
Manchester
Vienna
Stockholm
Manchester
off-peak
Madrid
Rome
Milan
Linate
Dublin
Lisbon low
off-_k
Freight
1996
Geneva
Zurich
Vienna
Munich
Dusseldorf
Athens off-
peak
Athens
peak
Gatwick
off-peak
Gatwick
shoulder
Stansted
off-oeak
Night
Freight
1996
Helsinki
Stockholm
Geneva
Zurich
Cologne
Athens off-
peak
Athens
peak
Gatwick
off-pe._
Gatwick
shoulder
Stansted
Regional
1996
LondonCity
peak
LondonCity
off-peak
East
Midlands
peak
East
Midlands
off-peak
Belfast
Luxemburg
Liege
Charleroi
Ostende
Antwerp
World
1996
JFK
Tokyo
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Table 6: Airports with the highest and lowest average total charges for Chapter 2 aircraft
included in the ACM variants
mgaest
1 Dusseldorf
2 Frankfurt
3 Munich
4 Heathrow
Peak
5 Manchester
peak
lowest
I Rome
2 Milan Lmate
3 Madrid
4 Madrid peak
5
Europe
1996
Dusseldorf
Frankfurt
Munich
Heathrow
Peak
Manchester
peak
Europe
Night 1996
Dusseldorf
Frankfurt
Helsinki
Munich
Stockholm
Freight
1996
Dusseldorf
Cologne
Frankfurt
Muni_
Night
Freight
1996
Cologne
Dusseldorf
Frankfurt
Helsinki
Regional
1996
Nurnberg
LondonCity
peak
LondonCity
off-peak
Frankfurt
Bremen
World 1996
JFK
TokyoNarita
Frankfurt
Chicago
Heathrow
Peak
Europe 1995
Dublin
Rome
Milan
Lmate
Madrid
Madrid
Dublin
Madrid
Dublin
Rome
Milan Lmate
Lisbon low
Geneva
Athens off-
peak
Athens
peak
Gat_Jck
off-peak
Gatwick
shoulder
Stansted
off-peak
Stockholm
Athens off-
peak
Athens
peak
Oatwick
off-peak
Oatwick
shoulder
Stansted
off-peak
Charleroi
Liege
Luxemburg
Ostende
Antwerp
MexicoCib'
'A'
Singapore
Mexico City
'B'
Johannesburg
Seoul
Table 7: Schiphol rankings in the ACM variants
number of airports in
ACM variant
Schiphol rank all
aircraft (1 =highest
charges)
Schiphol rank Chapter
2 aircraft
Schiphol rank Chapter
"4aircraft
Europe Europe
1995 1996
28 29
12 14
12 12
11 14
Europe
Night
1996
25
13
12
14
Freight
1996
37
II
II
15
Night
Freight
1996
37
15
15
2O
World
1996
27
15
10
15
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Abstract
The new Community regulations governing Duty Free Shopping come
into force on 30 th June 1999. From this time onwards Duty Free
Shopping will cease to exist within the EC. As a result of this
development, airports in Spain are going, to lose a major source of
revenue. As Duty Free Shopping is of such significance in the context of
the range of services provided by the Spanish airport network, we
believe that the impact that the new regulations will have is worth
evaluating. With this aim in view, we have drawn up an ad hoc revenue
model in order to examine the influence which variables such as
international travel and Duty Free Shopping (DFS) have on the
generation of income in the Spanish airport network. We will attempt to
evaluate loss of earnings in airports of the type which could be
considered ideal for DFS but which nevertheless lack this type of
service.
I. Introduction.
Duty Free Shops (DFS) were originally establishments, which basically
offered tax-free goods such as perfumes, tobacco products and spirits.
Such items were designed for last minute shopping. Nowadays, however,
all sorts of items are on sale, such as designer clothing and eyewear, or
electronic appliances like cameras, radios, computer goods and many
others.
Only 11 airports in the Spanish national network possess DFS (Alicante,
Almeria, Barcelona, Ibiza, Madrid/Barajas, Malaga, Menorca, Palma de
Mallorca, Reus, Sevilla and Valencia). The overall revenue from DFS at
these airports in 1991 was some 21 million pounds. The following year
this figure increased by almost 21%, representing 7.3% of total income
and some 20% of non-aeronautical income.
The application of the Single European Act will, amongst other things,
remove customs barriers between EC member states. Member states will
be permitted to continue with tax exemption on goods purchased in DFS
until 30 th June 1999. After that time the facility will cease to exist. As a
result, a major source of revenue for Spanish airports will be lost. For
this reason, and owing to the importance of this activity in the context of
the range of services offered by the Spanish airport network, we consider
that it is desirable to quantify the impact that the application of the new
regulations will have.
2. The Model
By means of an ad hoc model (see Doganis, 1973), we will attempt to
evaluate the influence of DFS with respect to income generation in the
Spanish airport network. The model in log form is as follows:
Ln(I) = Ln(a)+ fl ,Ln(PN)+ fl 2Ln(PINT)+ fls D +la
where:
I
PN
= total revenue _, both aeronautical and non-aeronautical
= number of passengers on national flights
PINT = number of passengers on international flights
D = dummy variable
D=I where the airport possesses duty free facilities
D= 0 where it does not
Dummy variable D is an attempt to express the influence of DFS on
income generation. This must be significant; bearing in mind that it is the
largest source of non-aeronautical income for the Spanish airport
network.
Of the thirty-one airports included in this study, fourteen produced a
surplus. Of these fourteen, nine are tourist airports (i.e. international
passenger traffic is greater than domestic traffic). The importance of this
type of traffic for income generation in Spanish airports is thus self-
evident. The introduction of variable PINT in the model (number of
passengers on international flights) attempts to express this influence.
The number of passengers on international flights has a clear influence
on income generation, since this type of traffic requires services such as
banks, shops, rent-a-car, etc., all of which generate extra income for the
airports. Furthermore, planes used on international flights are larger than
those used for domestic flights and are thus more profitable from the
point of view of landing charges, which increase in accordance with the
weight of the aircraft. These considerations lead us to the supposition
that the variable for the number of passengers on international flights is
relevant to the generation of both aeronautical and non-aeronautical
income. In both cases the coefficient estimate sign will be positive.
i Total revenue is the sum total of aeronautical and non-aeronautical income.
3. The Results
The least square estimators are presented on the following table:
Table 1" Income equations (year 1992)
CT" statistic between brackets )
Dependent
Variable a I_ 13_ D
Ln TR -3.9 0.41 0.39 0.46
(-6.1) (6.6) (9.5) (2.4)
Ln NAR -6.25 0.6 0.28 0.7
(-9.4) (9.2) (6.7) (3.4)
Ln AR -3.99 0.314 0.48 -
(-5.53) (4.5) (12.7)
R 2
0.952
0.949
0.937
F
179.2
169.8
208.3
Ln TR : Natural logarithm of total income.
Ln NAR: Natural logarithm of non-aeronautical income.
Ln AR: Natural logarithm of aeronautical income.
R2,F : Coefficient of determination and statistic F.
The dummy variable used to represent the existence or otherwise of DFS
facilities was statistically relevant in both cases, although it had a greater
influence in the non-aeronautical income model. This confirms the
theoretical hypothesis with respect to DFS activity. The coefficient
estimated for this variable in the non-aeronautical income model was
0.7 2, indicating that amongst airports with similar traffic statistics; those,
which possess DFS, earn twice as much non-aeronautical income as
those, which do not.
The PINT variable was significant in the determining of Spanish airports
income and was especially significant in terms of the generation of
aeronautical income. However, the relevancy presented by this variable
with respect to non-aeronautical income generation indicates, perhaps,
the lack of development of commercial activity related to this type of
traffic in Spanish airports.
2Aeronautical income (airports with DFS)/Aeronautical income (airports without DFS) = e 0.7 = 2
The non-aeronautical income per passenger ratio (see table 2) represents
non-aeronautical income generated per passenger in the year 1992.
Airports such as Lanzarote and Fuerteventura, which do not possess DFS
facilities, generated less than half as much non-aeronautical income per
passenger as Ibiza and Menorca, although all four airports had similar
volumes of traffic. The same is true of Gran Canaria and Tenerife
airports with respect to M_laga.
The airports with the highest non-aeronautical income per passenger
transported were: M_ilaga, Madrid/barajas, Barcelona and Alicante. The
first and the last of these are airports of a tourist nature - international
traffic in both these airports represented about 70% of the total. Income
obtained from DFS at both airports represented approximately 50% of
the overall figure for commercial activity income. Airports such as
Lanzarote and Fuerteventura, on the other hand, where international
traffic percentages were 65% and 73% respectively, were at the bottom
of the list with regard to non-aeronautical income generation. It is
therefore clear that Canary Islands airports suffer a major loss of income
as a result of not possessing DFS facilities.
Only eleven of the thirty-one airports covered by the survey possess DFS
facilities. This indicates that the development of commercial activity in
most of these airports falls below the potential for exploitation, which
exists in the majority of them. Nevertheless, such development is limited
by factors such as the size and design of terminal buildings and the
availability of space. Furthermore, the range of activities, which could be
installed, would depend on the individual characteristics of traffic
circulation in their respective terminals. Such factors do not come under
the control of airport administrators.
Another thing to bear in mind is the "unfair competition,,3 effect that this
type of business activity would have on local businesses. DFS within the
EC has been stopped for this very reason. The repercussions for the small
businesses which have traditionally satisfied local demand could be
significant (Doganis, 1992).
DFS at Spanish airports is managed by ALDEASA. In accordance with Royal Decree 2417 of 9_
August 1974, this company possesses a monopoly in that it is the only enterprise authorised by the
Spanish State to exploit DFS in Spanish airports.
Airpor_
Table 2: Ratio. (Year 1992)
Total income Aeronautical income
per passenger per passenger
Airport with surplus
Non-aeronautical
income per passenger
I
Madrid/Barajas 1037.2 644.3 392.8
Palma de Mallorca 745.1 51 I. 1 234
Barcelona 893.6 542.5 351
Tenerife 699.2 499.3 199.9
Gran Canada 752.7 538.5 214.2
Malaga 982.4 577 405.4
Lanzarote 631.6 526.9 104.7
Alicante 851.6 513 338.5
Ibiza 765.7 499.7 266
Sevilla 775.2 443.4 331.7
Fuerteventura 660.4 552 108.3
Menorca 718.5 452.2 266.2
Valencia 764.I 474.7 289.3
Bilbao 566 318.8 247.I
Airport with deficit
° .
Valladolid
Reus
Zaragoza
Jerez
La Palma
San Sebasti/m
Murcia/San Javier
Pamplona
La Conaha
Vigo
Asturias
Almeria
Santander
Granada
Santiago
Vitoria
573.4
1334
1127.1
540.4
375.9
377.6
732.1
347.1
291
359.7
324.7
681
368.9
350.1
615.1
549.8
299
1150.8
825.4
286.2
245.3
206.4
487.1
261.7
197.7
198
187.5
468.8
211.2
209
326.7
308.3
74.3
183.2
301.6
254.3
130.6
171.1
245
85.4
93.2
161.6
137.1
212.2
157.6
141.1
288.4
241.4
4. Conclusions
According to the results obtained, Spanish airports are losing substantial
income because of a lack of development of commercial activity. Canary
Island airports stand out particularly in this context, in that they possess
ideal characteristics for the implementation of DFS. The amount of
international traffic, almost all of which proceeds fi'om EC countries,
circulating through Canary Islands terminals, is considerable. Therefore, in
the four years remaining before the new EC customs rulings come into
effect, Canary Islands airports could take advantage of this opportunity b'y
installing DFS facilities. However, the establishing of DFS facilities in
Canary Island airports could have negative financial repercussions for
local businesses.
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Abstract
Conventional non-parametric efficiency measurement relies on superlative index number based
measures of total factor productivi_-. In most instances, this measure is decomposed into various
components such as scale effects and technological change. The decomposition usually requires
estimation of a flexible cost function. This approach has a varie_- of dra_backs. Firstly, it is based
on a -non-frontier" notion of efficiency. Secondly, it usually requires behaxioral assumptions such as
profit maximization or cost minimization, and lastly, it requires data on both prices and quantities of
outputs and inputs.
In recent years, attention has shifted towards alternatives such as Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA).
DEA does not require the assumptions such as profit maximization, or. data on prices and has been
used to measure performance of non-profit organizations. DEA based studies _]_ically use cross-
sectional data and therefore, unlike conventional "
changes in productive efficiency over lime. This index number based studies, are unable to analyze
paper uses panel data on 22 U.S. airports over the
five-year period 1989-93 to construct a Malmquist index of productivit3-change and decomposes it
into scale effects, efficient, effects and technical change. The paper also explores the nested
relationship between airside efficiency and terminal el_iciency and the tradeoffs between lower costs
and higher re_'enues.
I. INTRODUCTION
Overthe last two decades a great deal of effort and resources have been expended in developing
measures of performance for carriers in the different modes of transportation. This had been
stimulated by both deregulation and privatization initiatives. Measures of productivity
performance, efficient.." and effectiveness are now available for railways, airlines, trucking, and
public transit firms. The measures range from relatively simple quantifies, such as output per
employee, to more sophisticated measures such as TFP (Total Factor Productisity) - a standard
which takes account of all inputs in the production process. These measures have been used to
assess alternative management actions and strategies in developing, for example, more effective
means of satisf)ing the objectives of the osx_ers or operators. They have also been used to
measure technical progress and to rank carriers by their productivity gains. In other cases,
measures of cost and service effectiveness have been developed in order to e_aluate financing for
capital projects and changes in public policy such as deregulation.
The motivation for this paper stems from the evolving trends of 'redefining the way in which
government operates' and the growing lenden_" to shift major capital investments and
operations in transportation away from direct government control. This can mean anything from
privatizing or commercializing infrastructure to creating incentives for managers so that they
pursue particular financial targets and perform in a g_ay that maximizes the objectives of the
owners. Worldwide this has taken such forms as airport and roadway privatization as well as
commercialization through joint public/private ownership or the contracting out of various
services. In many cases these enterprises are break-even or not-for-profit. Under such
circumstances standard financial measures of performance such as the rate of return on capital
or profits are not meaningful. It is also difficult to define a measure of output or service as well.
A major impetus behind the desire to prixatize or at least commercialize airports, roadways and
ports throughout the world is the lack of im'estment capital available from governments to meet
the needs of these infrastructure to invest in new facilities, terminals and equipment.
Furthermore, management is under increasing pressure to wean them from government support
by becoming more efficient. Airports, in particular, are recognized as mature 'firms' that should
be able to stand-alone and operate without government support or interference.
Continued deregulation of carriers has provided an additional stimulus to improve airport
performance. Despite airport charges being only 5-7 percent of total operating costs, airlines
operate in highiy competitive markets and cannot easily pass rate increases on to customers. 1
They have continued to place pressure on airports to increase their efficiency. A set of
pert:ormance measures would allow an airport to demonstrate any improvements. We also
develop a linkage between the performance measure and management strategies arguing that it
is not sufficient to simply describe performance but also to be able to assess it and understand
how managers can affect their performance. The focus in this paper is upon air transportation
infrastructure but we believe the approach has broad application.
In this paper we suggest that a method which can be used to assess the performance of the
management of transportation infrastructure is Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). We use
airports as our context. Section 2 provides a brief overview of airport operations and issues to
consider in developing performance measures. In section 3 we examine various approaches to
efficiency measurement. Section 4 contains the description of the data and the Malmquist
producti_i_ index. The empirical results are reported and discussed in section 5 while the
conclusions are contained in section 6.
t These figures are for North America. The costs in Europe and Asia are somewhat higher due to
higher fees for navigation and airport rates and charges.
2. AIRPORT OPERATIONS AND ORGANIZATION
While all business enterprises, whether in the public or private sector, need to continuously
• j po out that in a competitive environment, market
forces will ensure that optimal Performance is equated with profitability. However. the
conditions under _vluch airports oPerate are far from competitive. Regulatory.. geographical,
economic, social and political constraints all hinder direct competition between airports. At the
same time. the extent to which airports can attract other airports' traffic x_,ith different prices or
service levels is also limited. In other words, the demand for airport services is likely to berelatively inelastic."
The competitive environment of the aviation industry in North America and elsewhere means
greater market mobility for carriers and freedom to establish linkages and alliances. Carriers
enter and exit markets and change frequency, of service and gauge of aircraft. They form
partnerships, alliances and take equity positions in other national and global carriers. All of
these factors have an impact upon airport demands and utilization. With all of the turmoil
brought about _, consolidation and restructuring of the air carrier indnstry and the desire to
have an efficient aviation system (air carriers and airports) it seems reasonable that the impact
of the domestic polio.-decisions or policies on efficient use of resources should be investigated.2
Airports are subject to peak demands. To have perfectly satisfied customers (the airlines and
their passengers) airports would need to supply sufficient runway and terminal capacity to avoid
delays at even the busiest Periods. allowing the airlines to maximize fleet utilization and
improve load factors by providing sen'ice when their customers, the ssen e .
A_.rpo..ns, conversely. _'ouid like the airlines to s,',rea a ,i,,,. n:_,_, pa., g rs m.ost desire.
• v ,, u,_ta xu/_m over tile entire day so as to
numrmze tundra), and terminal requirements. The advent of hubbing has exacerbated this
dichotomy with its concentration of arrivals and departures in narrow time bands. Even at those
airports that are not used as hubs by an.,,-airline, aircraft movements are not evenly distributed.
Among the other factors listed by Ashford (1984) that affect an airport's peaking characteristics
is the domestic/international tra_c mix as well as the long haul/short haul mix.
Doganis (1992) gives an interesting illnstration of the pressures being brought to bear on runway
capaci_.. Between 1971 and 1982. a Period in which the average annual increase in the number
of passengers was 5.2 Per cent, all of the growth was accommodated by higher load factors
(33%) and increased aircraft size (67%) with the number of departures remaining unchanged.
Bemeen 1982 and 1986. however, when the annual average growth rate rose to 8.8%, the
increase in demand gas met almost entirely (97%) by increasing the number of departures.
While airports should be asked to adhere to private financial standards, they must also be judged
in the contex-t of their overall goals. These can be "diverse, often not clearly articulated, and
frequently specified (or influenced) less by professional managers than by public policy and
political considerations _ithin ,,arions sponsoring governments" (U.S. DOT, 1987). In the case
of airports, it has been argued, federal support has resulted in facilities that are not so much
what is needed as what the government is willing to pay for (Wells, 1992). Bhargava et al.
(1993) found little in the way of"goaVobjectives as a criterion" in much of the work he
re_-iewed, finding instead the assumption that "financial measures appropriately capture the
2 Even as "'mere" landlords, however, the business of airport planning and management is ex'tremely
challenging. As Dogams (1992) points out: "Airport authorities must invest substantial capital sums
in large and immovable assets that have no alternative use, to satisfy a demand over which they have
little control except indirectly. It is the airlines and not the airports who decide where and how'the
demand for air travel or air freight will be met. Airports merely provide a facilio,- for bring together
airlines and their potential customers. Thus. matching the provision of airport capacity _ith the
demand while achieving and maintaining airport profitability and an adequate level of customer
satisfaction is a difficult task. It is made particularly difficult because investments to ex-pand airport
capacity are lump,,', increasing effective capacity by much more than is needed in the short term, andbecause they must be planned long in advance"
objcctivcs of the firm." Given the unique position of airports, profit measures are an inadequate,
if not totally misleading means of assessing management performance.
Airports face many of the same problems of any public utility in which capital is lump)" and
marginal operating costs low. For a manufacturing firm at a constant level of production, a
slowdown in sales would be reflected as an increase in inventory and not a decrease in
efficiency. If the slowdo_u were to be anticipated and production reduced, the amount of inputs
consumed would like_Jse be reduced leaving the output/input ratio (i.e.. productivity)
unchanged (ignoring possible economies of scale). With most airports, however, the factors of
production (inputs) usually do not change )'ear to year and there can be no inventory of
production. Efficiency, therefore, will suffer an)time there is a slowdo_ in the economy or by
the airlines utilizing the airport, regardless of airport management ability or efforts. 3
Since such exogenous factors do exist, how does one account internally for a change in output?
If output is down. does this mean anything under the airport's control has become less
productive? This exogenous siowdowu needs to be accounted for in order to provide an accurate
measure of managerial performance. In essence we want to determine how much variation in
airport performance can be attributed to managerial decision-making and initiatives and what
are the important decisions or strategies within that portion of airport performance an airport
manager can affect.
3. PRODUCTIVITY AND EFFICIENCY
Productivity and efficiency mean different things to different people and in some instances are
interpreted as being _'nonymous. Though the concepts are related, in general, productivity can be
thought of as being a broader concept than efficiency. Both concepts can be related to a production
function which is the primitive (in the single output case) representing the transformation of inputs to
output. From a conceptual viewpoint, productivity and efficiency measurement can be classified into
the frontier and non-frontier approaches and from an implementation viewpoint, into parametric and
non-parametric. These are discussed below.
Consider the simple case of one output, one fixed factor of production - capital and one variable factor
of production - labour. A measure of partial productivity could be labour productivity, which is
output per unit of labour input, or, the average product of labour. An increase in the average product
of labour would represent an increase in productivity however, as discussed below, this could come
from a variety of sources.
Figure 1 illustrates a production function F(.): output is measured on the vertical axis and input on the
horizontal a.xis. Consider a firm operating at the point A. This finn is operating at a point below the
production function. Its productivity is nothing but the slope of the ray through the origin OA. Some
researchers interpret the production function as a frontier, which represents the best practice. Though
all finns may have access to the same technology, some may be better at using the technology than
others. Firms that operate on the production function are obviously more efficient than those that do
not. Thus. a firm operating at the point B is more efficient than one operating at point A. Moving
from A to B increases productiviD- , but this increase is coming from catch-up or reducing technical
inefficiency. Similarly. there could be another firm operating at point C. This firm is technically
efficient just like the firm B, but it is utilizing the optimal scale of production and therefore has higher
productivity than B, but the source of the higher productivity in this case is economies of scale. Thus
what Figure 1 shows us is that productivity improvements can have different sources.
3 A graphic example, though atypical in magnitude, is Anchorage International which has seen its
concession revenue shrink from $19.5 million in 1990 to $5.4 million in 1993 due to the severe
reduction in layovers and technical stops of aircraft fl)_ng bem,oen the U.S. and Japan. Another
example is Dayton International, where passenger traffic has been cut in half betwoen the time of the
USAir merger with Piedmont Aviation on August 5, 1989 and the final closure of their Dayton hub in
January of 1992
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Now considerthe additionof anotherproductionfunctionto Figure 1. The new productionfunction,
F'(.), lies above the old one. This represents innovation, technical change or technicalprogress. The
production function is also sometimes interpreted as a stochastic frontier, which moves out over time
due to advances in technology. Thus, fu'm B could move to new position D, doing so will increase
productivity, but the source of the productivity improvement is not a reduction in technical
inefficiency or as a result of exploiting scale economies, but due to technical change or innovation.
Conventional or non-frontier approaches to productivity measurement ignore technical efficiency.
These measures assume either that all firms are on the frontier or that their distance from the frontier
does not change over time.
From an implementation vieggoint, methods of measuring efficiency can be broadly classified into
non-parametric and parametric. Non-parametric methods include indexes of partial and total factor
productivity, and data envelopment analysis. The latter is essentially a linear programming based
method. Parametric methods involve the estimation of neoclassical and stochasticcost and or
production functions.
The data requirements for the various methods differ, as do their ability to inform managerial
decisions. The use of partial productixi_, measures is pervasive and though these measures are easy to
understand and compute, they can be quite misleading, because they. do not reflect differences in
factor prices nor do the- take account of differences in the other factors used in production. Partial
productis_t3, measures are also unable to handle multiple outputs.
One solution to some of these problems is to construct a TOrnqvist index of total factor productivity
(TFP). This measure does not suffer from the shortcomings of partial productivity measure, but taken
alone it is not very informative for evaluating management strategies. Extracting more information
from measures of total factor productivity _gically requires reliance on estimating parametric neo-
classical cost or production functions.4 The data requirements are more onerous than partial
4 These have their ot_laproblems. For example, though in theory all tie.cable functional forms can
approximate an unknm_ production technolo_', in practice, results may differ quite substantially.
Thus choice of functional form becomes an important issue. In addition_ flexibiliw has a price, that
is. violation of theoretical consistent requirements for cost minimization. Stochastic or frontier cost
mcasurcs. In addition to data on physical inputs and outputs, this measure also requires information
on priccs, which is used to aggregate inputs and outputs.
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is a frontier method and an alternative that has found favor in
applications where the behavioural objective is neither cost minimization, nor profit maximization, or
where outputs are not easily or clearly defined; for example in measuring effncienc2,,' in schools.
hospitals or government institutions. It is also useful in determining the efficiency of firms that
consume or produce inputs or outputs, which lack natural prices. DEA is a [linear] programming
based technique and the basic model only requires information on inputs and outputs. 5 DEA can
incorporate multiple outputs and inputs; in fact, inputs and outputs can be defined in a very general
manner without getting into problems of aggregation. 6 If more of a measure is desirable it can be
modeled as output and if less of something is better, it can be interpreted as input. This is an
attractive feature as in many service industries such as banking, it is difficult to determine whether
deposits, for example, are an output or an input which produces loans. DEA can also make use of
prox)' outputs including output combinations that would not be used with other efficiency measles. 7
DEA provides a scalar measure of relative efficiency by comparing the efficiency achieved by a
decision-making unit (DMU) with the effnciency obtained by similar DMUs. The method allows us to
obtain a well-defined relation between outputs and inputs. In the case of a single output this relation
corresponds to a production function in which the output is maximal for the indicated inputs. In the
more general case of multiple outputs this relation can be defined as an efficient production pos._bflity
surface or frontier. As this production possibility surface or frontier is derived from empirical
obser,'ations, it measures the relative efficiency of DMUs that can be obtained with the existing
technology or management strategy. Technological or managerial change can be evalnated by
considering each set of values for different time periods for the same DMU as separate entities (each
set of values as a different DMU). If there is a significant change in technology or management
strategies this will be reflected in a change in the production possibility surface. 8 This paper uses the
Malmquist index of productivity change, which is then decomposed into various components such as
scale efficiency change and technical efficiency change. This is a DEA based method and allows us to
take advantage of the fact that we have a panel data set. 9
4. THE MALMQUIST PRODUCTIVITY INDEX
FoUowing F_ire (1994a), we begin by defining the production technology T in any given time period.
T is the set of all feasible input-outpnt vectors, x is an N dimensional vector of inputs andy is an M
dimensional vector of outputs.
T = {(x,y):x can produce y} (1)
Based on certain axioms [Shephard (1970), F_re (1988)] one can define an output distance function
which is a multi-ontput generalization of what in the single output case would be the ratio of actual to
potential output. Thus if the production point is on the frontier, this ratio equals unity. The distance
and production functions suffer from the same shortcomings though unlike neoclassical famctious-
they are able to distinguish technical progress (movement in the frontier) from technical inefficiency
(distance from the frontier).
If factor price data are available. DEA can be used to analyze cost efficiency. Firms maybe
technically efficient but cost inefficient.
6 All productivity measures have the shortcoming that the)" do not directly include user-borne costs.
Using proxies can include these.
For example, gross-ton-miles and car-miles or gross-ton-miles and revenues as alternative measures
of outputs in the rail industry.
s For theory and applications of DEA see Charnes et al. (1994a)
9 Traditionally. panel data have been handled in DEA via window analysis. Though this pro,,ides
some indication of changes in efficiency over time. the choice of window width is arbitraD. For an
ar_r_licalion to the carbonated beverage industry see Eechambadi (1985) and Charnes et al (1994b).
functionis the reciprocal of the Farrell output-orienled measure of efficient., which can be calculatedusing DEA.
D (x,y) = inf {O: {x,y/O} _ T} (2)
Caves. Christensen and Diewen (1982) define the Malmquist productixitv index _ith reference to the
technology in time period t as:
- Dt(x'+l'Y'+n)
D, (xt,y,) o)
A similar measure could be defined using period t+l as the base. To avoid arbitrariness in the choice
of base period. F_ire et at. (1994a,b) propose using the geometric mean oft.he indexes for the periods t
and t-1 which )ields the following Malmquist index ofproductivi_, change:
=_]_J[Dt(xt,yt) ][_lDt+l(xt,yt_- _ (4)
Fare et al. (1994a.b) show that the above measure can also be expressed as:
Mt.t+ 1 =.Dt+l(Xt+l'Yt+l) , __,Dt(xt,Yt)
In the above equation, the first term measures efficiency change and the second term (in square
brackets) measures technical change. Calculating Malmquist index and its components requires the
calculation of four distances: D t (x t ,Yt ), Dt+l (xt+ l ,Yt+l ), Dt (xt+ l,yt+l) and
Dt +! (xt, Yt ). This is accomplished by solx_ng four (constant returns to scale) linear programming
problems, thus making use of the fact that output distance function is the im-erse of the Fan'ell output
oriented measure of technical efficiency. For each firm k, D t (xt, Yt ) can be computed as follows,
as can Dr+ 1 (xt+ 1,Yt+l ) by substituting t+l for t
((Dt(xt,yt)) -1 = max ak
0k ,t
S.t.
K
Ok ykt,m < _ t_ k,t k
- Yt,m m=l .... ,M (6)
k=l
K
_'_'k.t xk x kt,n < t,n 1?= 1,...,N
k=l
Ik.t>0 k=l .... ,K
Similarly. D t (xt+ 1,Yt+l ) can be computed as follows, as can Dr+ 1 (x t ,Yt ) by interchanging t_-I
and t:
((Dt(Xt+l,Yt+l)) -1 = max Ok
0t ,2k
s.l.
K
k k
Ok Yt+l.m < Z Ak.t Yt.m m = I,...,M
k=l
K
Z2k,txk < kt,n Xt+l.n n= I,...,N
k=l
2k, t_>O k=l,...,K
(7)
Both the efficiency change and technical change measures in (5) can be decomposed further [Fare,
Grosskopf and Roos (1996), Fare and Grosskopf (1998)]. They define the output oriented measure of
scale efficiency as the ratio of an output oriented distance function for a variable returns to scale
technology to that for a constant returns to scale techaoiogy or:
Dt(xt'YtIV) (8)
St(xt'Yt ) = Dt(xt,Y t C)
Calculating this requires solving the LP in (6) with the following additional restriction for variable
returns to scale:
K
Z ik, t = 1 (9)
k=I
Thus. the efficieney change component in (5) can be decomposed into scale efficiency change and
pure efficiency change as:
EFFCH = St(xt'Yt) Ot+l(Xt+l'Yt+l_') (10)
St+l(Xt+l,Yt+l) Ot(xt,Yt[V)
The technical change component in (5) can also be decomposed as the product of the magnitude of
technical change and (input and output) bias, where magnitude is defined as follows: 10
MTECH = D, (x,,Yt) (II)
Dt+l(Xt+l,Yt+l)
To summarize, the Malmquist index of productivit3 change can be represented as the product of
efficiency change and technical change. Efficient" change can be further decomposed as the sum
product of scale efficiency change and pure efficient change, whereas technical change can be
decomposed as the sum product of the change in the magnitude of technical change and bias.
5. DATA AND RESULTS
Our data set is composed of information from 22 of the top 30 airports in the United States for the
period 1989-1993. There are 110 observations organized in a panel. We recognize that an airport is
an integration of airside facilities (runways, taxiwa._, apron's etc.) and terminal facilities that
provide the linkage to the airside. Howe_'er, there is no reason why each sub-production process of
the "airport production function' should exhibit the same levels or grogOt in productivity. Indeed ff
one examines the unit operating costs of movements (AC per movement) it appears there are
relatively constant returns to scale but capacity utilization economies while ff one examines unit
operating costs of passengers (AC per passenger) there are apparent increasing returns to density: that
io The decomposition of techmcal chan_e is also discussed in Grifell-Tati6 and Lovell (1997_.
is. unit cost decreases with numbers of passengers served The cost economies seem then to arise from
the econouues of large aircraft. As a fnai argument, a different set of management strategies apply to
each of these two DT_esof facilities. Airport managers have, one would expect, greater ease putting in
place terminal strategies rather than movement strategies simply due tojurisdiction and property
rights. There is also the interaction between airline strategies and airport productivity. In the past
airports were perceived as 'public utilities" and their ability to affect their productivity was seen asbeing limited.
The models estimated define airports as a composite of producing two different but relatedservices.
these being terminal services and movements. Terminal services are modeled as having two outputs -
number of passengers and pounds of cargo and six inputs - number of runways, number of gates,
terminal area, number of employees, number of baggage collection belts and number of public parking
spots. Movements have two outputs - air carrier movements and commuter movements and four
inputs - airport area, number of run,_ays, runawayarea and number of employees. 11 The results
presented in Table 1 and Table 2 and illustrated in Figure and Figure are discussed below.
The results provide some interesting comparisons both within the products and across the products
both within and across airports. For example. Boston [Logan Airport] exhibits a significant growth in
productivi_, for movements with the majority of it coming from utilization of scale efficiency gains -
improving the efficient use of existing resources with managing traffic, for example - while for
terminals it exhibits relatively low productivity gro_h. In fact it appears that terminal utilization
efficiency has diminished while there has been positive technical change. However, the relative values
of efficiency are very different. Terminal efficiency was quite h_gh at the beginning of the sample
period while airside efficiency was relatively poor but improved markedly over five years. As is true
Salt Lake City but in most of cases the ine/iiciencies are moving in the s_e direction. The hub of
mr/sons exhibit some loose similarities. It appears that as hubbing rises terminal efficiency, improves
but movements efficiency decreases most likely due to the feed from small commuter aircraft.
lI We do not have disaggregated data on employees involved in the provision of terminal services and
those involved in producing movements, In addition, we do not have data on fuel and other inputssuch as materials.
Table 1
Terminals
(Average Annual Percentage Rate of Grox_th)
Terminals 1 2
Malmqui Efficienc
st y
TFP 3+4
2+5
Anchorage 3.5 4.3
Atlanta 2.2 0.0
Boston 0.7 -1.4
Baltimore/Washington -3.3 -5.0
Charlotte/Douglas 1.6 0.0
Chicago Midway -5.7 -5.7
Cincinnati/N Kentucky 0.4 -2.4
Cleveland Int'l 9.2 7.3
FT. Lauderdale 2.2 0.0
Kansas Ci_' -7.7 -8.4
Memphis 1.7 0.0
Mihvaukee -5.8 -8.9
Minneapolis-St.Paul 4.8 2.3
Ontario 0.8 0.0
Phoenix -3.5 -1.1
Portland 4.9 1.9
St. Louis -0.2 -2.5
Salt Lake CiD' 5.9 3.5
San Diego -0.3 0.0
San Francisco 1.3 0.0
San Jose -12.8 -10.7
Seattle-Tacoma 0.4 -2.4
All Airports
3 4 5 6 7
Scale Pure Technical Magnitude Biasl2
Efficienc Efficienc Change of
y y 6+7 Technical
Change
4.3 0.0 -0.7 -0.5 -0.2
0.0 0.0 2.2 -0.2 2.4
-0.4 -1.0 2.1 2.1 0.0
0.0 -5.0 1.8 1.7 0.1
-0.9 0.9 1.6 0.8 0.7
-5.7 0.0 0.0 -0.3 0.3
0.0 -2.3 2.9 2.5 0.4
1.1 6.2 1.7 1.6 0.1
0.0 0.0 2.2 2.1 0.1
7.2 -14.5 0.8 1.5 -0.7
0.0 0.0 1.7 -6.4 8.7
-8.0 -1.0 3.4 4.7 -1.2
0.0 2.3 2.4 2.3 0.0
0.0 0.0 0.8 -6.6 8.0
-1.1 0.0 -2.4 -7.3 5.3
-0.1 2.0 2.9 2.9 0.0
-0.7 -1.8 2.4 2.4 0.0
-1.2 4.7 2.4 2.7 -0.3
0.0 0.0 -0.3 -3.3 3.1
0.0 0.0 1.3 1.2 O. 1
-0.1 -10.6 -2.3 -5.9 3.8
-2.4 0.0 2.8 -1.6 4.4
-0.1 -1.4 -0.4 -1.0 1.3 -0.2 l.a
Note: We subtract 1 from the measures described in Section 4 and multiply by 100, to convert our
results to average annual percentage rates of gro_h. The relationship between measures becomes
additive rather than multiplicative.
12 If the magnitude of technical change equals technical change, then (change in) bias is zero. When
bias is zero. isoquants shift out in a parallel manner - technical change is neutral (joint neutral, both
_ith respect to outputs and inputs). When technological change is biased (suppose input biased, so
there is one output and 2 inputs - so we can only have input bias, then they (isoquants) gill shift and
twist at the same time. With multiple outputs and inputs _e can have both input and output biases,
the decomposition reported does not separate input and output biases. Biases could be the result of say
reform programs.
Movements
Table 2
Movements
(Average Annual Percentage Rate of Gro_lh)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Mahnqui Efficiency Scale Pure Technical Magnitude Bias
st 3+4 Efficienc Efficienc Change ofTFP
Y Y 6+7 Technical2+5
Change
Anchorage 6.I 3.3 0.2 3.I 2.8 2.5 0.3
Atlanta -0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.6 -3.3 2.8
Boston 14.2 10.5 6.3 3.9 3.4 1.8 1.6
Baltimore/Washington -0.5 -2.8 1.7 -4.4 2.4 1.8 0.6
Charlotte/Douglas -1.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 -1.2 -5.5 4.5
Chicago-Midway -25.1 -21.9 -6.4 -16.5 -4.2 -5.9 1.8
Cincinnati/N Kentucky 1.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.6 -2.2 3.9
Cleveland Int'l 2.3 2.4 -1.1 3.5 -0. l -0.2 0.1
FT. Lauderdale -15.0 -12.8 -1.5 -11.5 -2.5 -4.7 2.3
Kansas City -10.3 -9.8 4.1 -13.3 -0.6 -1.3 0.7
Memphis 4.3 6.0 -0.1 6.0 -1.6 -3.3 1.7
Milwaukee 6.4 7.0 0.0 6.9 -0.6 -0.5 -0.1
Minneapolis-St.Paul 6.7 7.1 1.6 5.4 -0.4 1.1 -1.5
Ontario 0.6 4.0 2.0 1.9 -3.3 -3.3 0.0
Phoenix 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 -2.3 2.8
Portland 5.2 3.4 0.0 3.4 1.8 1.8 0.0
St. Louis 1.1 5.1 3.7 1.4 -3.8 -3.9 0.1
Salt Lake City -1.6 0.8 0.6 0.2 -2.3 -3.5 1.3
San Diego -0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 4).6 -6.9 6.7
San Francisco 0.0 -2.9 -1.3 -1.6 2.9 3.4 -0.5
Sail Jose 10.2 12.9 1.9 10.9 -2.4 ..4.8 2.6
Seatlle-Tacoma 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 -1.7 1.9
-0.1 0.3 0.5 -0.2 -0.4 -1.9
We subtract 1 from the measures described in Section 4 and multiply by 100. to convert our
1.5
results to average annual percentage rates of growth. The relationship between measures becomes
additive rather than multiplicative.
An examination of Figure and Figure illustrates the variation in productive efficiency among airports
and the relative differences in airside and terminal efficiency both between and at the same airport.
Terminals tend to be, on average, more efficient than alrside - the index in near I for most terminals
whereas the index for airside is less than 1 influenced mostly by the recession in 1990-91. Airports
that are hubs (and not gateways) exhibit a significant decrease in productivity in both airside and
terminals in 1990-91. In order to undertake a comparison of airport productivity Figure through
Figure illustrate the Malmquist productivity indices for both the airside and terminal operations for
each period 1989 through 1993.
Figure 2
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An examination of the four figures illustrates the large differences bet_veen airports and how lack of
performance in one area can. in some cases, be offset by better performance in another. A number of
airports, SFA. MDW. BOS. CLE, ATL, CVG. MCI. PDX. $TL and SAN have high pr_lucti_ity for
both the airside and terminals (see Figure ) while there do not appear to be airports that are 'equally"
bad at airside and terminal pr_xluctiviq,.'. Rather. the remaimng airports e."_hibit relatively better
_rformance in one area or another - see CLT, FLL, ONT and PHX in Figure. Phoenix, for example,
has high airside preductivi_" bu| Io_ terminal pr_luctivity.
Figure 4
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! Introduction
Airports in a multiple airport region, where passengers (traveling to a fixed
destination) are able to choose between different departure airports, will compete with
substitute airports for origin (and also destination) passengers. Passengers take a
number of decisions; they have to choose the (departure) airport, airline and airport
access mode (given that they already have decided they will fly). These choices can be
made simultaneously or sequentially. These choices depend on a number of variables
such as airport taxes and airport access times, frequency of service offered by the
airline and airfare, and availability and cost of the access mode. Moreover, these
choices may be mutually dependent; depending on whether these choices are taken
sequentially or simultaneously. The choice of airport access mode has been studied
only sparsely in the literature; notable exceptions are Bondzio (1996) and Harvey
(1986), who offer empirical studies of the passengers' choice of access mode in
Germany and the San Francisco Bay Area respectively. Both authors use multinomial
logit models with access time and cost as explanatory variables. Moreover, Bondzio
(1996) also estimates nested logit models and finds that business travelers make the
choices of access mode and airport sequentially while leisure travelers make the choice
simultaneously; the access time to the airport (which is highly mode dependent) is
concluded to be higher for business passengers than for leisure travelers.
In most studies on airport choice, the (aggregated) frequency is an explanatory
variable, but the airline choice is considered as given. Pels et al. (1998) found that a
nested model in which first an airport chosen and then an airline is statistically superior.
In this paper we will analyze the choice of access mode in the San Francisco Bay Area
in relation to the choice of airport and airline by means of a nested logit model. The
results will then be compared to the results (for Germany) of Bondzio (1996) -in order
to examine whether there are regional (international) differences in the determinants of
access mode choice- and Harvey (1986), addressing the same problem using data for
1980 -in order to investigate whether the determinants of access mode choice have
changed over time.
2 The econometric model
In this Section an econometric model for the joint access mode-airport-airline choice
will be formulated. First, in Subsection 2.1, a concise review of some of the references
already mentioned in the introduction will be offered, while next, based on the
discussion of these studies, the econometric model will be formulated in Subsection
2.2.
2.1 Literature review
Air travelers have to make a number of decisions. Access mode, departure airport and
airline are but some of the decisions to be made. These decisions are dependent on one
another, and should be modeled as such.
Bondzio (1996) estimated nested logit models to explain the joint access mode-
departure airport choice for German airports, using access time to the airport, access
costs and frequency of service as explanatory variables. For business travelers, a nested
model with the choice sequence (1) access mode and then (2) departure airport
appeared to be the (statistically) preferred model. For leisure travelers, it was
concluded that the nested structure which best replicated the behavior of business
travelers did not add much compared to a multinomial logit model, which was
therefore the preferred model specification.
Pels et al. (1998) found that a nested logit model with the choice sequence (1)
airport, and then (2) airline best explained the joint airport-airline choice for both
business and leisure travelers in the San Francisco Bay Area.
In both studies mentioned above, the nested structures were found to be
superior to the conventional multinomial logit models. In case of the airport-airline
choice, airlines operating from the same airport are closer substitutes than airlines
operating from different airports. Hence the introduction of a new airline.at a certain
airport will affect the airlines already operating from that airport more than airlines
operating from alternative airports. Likewise, if the train is the most preferred access
mode, airports that can be reached by train are closer substitutes than airports that
cannot be reached by train.
Basedon thefindingsof the studies discussed concisely in this subsection, it is
expected that a nested Iogit model would best explain the access mode-airport-airline
choice. A corresponding model will be formulated in the next Subsection.
2.2 The econometric model
Suppose a traveler has decided to fly to a particular destination (airport). The traveler
then has to choose an airline (/), departure airport (a t) and airport access mode (a).
There are several alternative model specifications. The most simple one is the
multinomial logit model where all combinations (l,d,a) are treated as alternatives of
which the derived utilities, by assumption, are independent. As a result, if one
alternative is added, all other alternatives would suffer proportionally; thus if at airport
d a new airline is introduced, all other alternatives (i.e. also at the alternative airports
d') would suffer proportionally, whereas it would be more reasonable to assume
alternatives including airport d would suffer more. To overcome this "independence of
irrelevant alternatives" assumption, a nested multinomial logit model can be specified.
Then one recognizes that there are clusters of alternatives of which the derived utilities
are correlated. Utilities of alternatives from different classes are not correlated. Then
the problem is to identify the different relevant clusters.
Let there be L airlines, D airports and A access modes. The alternatives made
up by the airlines operating from the same airport and the airport can be seen as
clusters of alternatives: L(d) c L, d _ D (see Pels et ai., 1998). Likewise, the
alternatives constituted by the airports and the same access mode can be seen as
clusters: D(a) c D, a _ A (see Bondzio, 1996). The corresponding probability model
is:
P(Ld, a) = P(a) P(d]a) P(lld, a) (1)
expCr---')
P(/id, a) = ,u
_ ,1 _L(d),d _D(a),a cA (2)_exp( )
P(d a) = exp( 0
_exp( 0 ) "
d"
,d _D(a),a _A (3)
exp(V. + Oln _ exp(Vd + 'u In Z exp(_-__il), \/.t j./
Z.. exp(V.. + Oln _ exp(V, + pin _ exp )
(4)
where I_ is the systematic utility derived from airline l, Va is the systematic utility
derived from airport d and Vo is the systematic utility derived from access mode a. In
this model, a passenger chooses an access mode based on characteristics of the access
mode and the maximum expected utility of using the airports available when using the
access mode. The passenger chooses an airport based on characteristics of the airport
and the maximum expected utility of using the airlines available from the airport. In
other words, the passenger first chooses the access mode, then the departure airport
and then the airline. Alternatively, the passenger chooses the access mode and
departure airport simultaneously and then chooses the airline: L(d,a) c L, d,a _ DxA
and in the probability model 0 = 1.
Let the systematic utility of using an airline I be given by
V_ : %p,+%ln(f,)+a. ln(s,) (5)
where p; is the airfare charged by airline 1; ctt, < O. ft is the frequency of service,
included in logarithmic form, as it is an indication of the "size" of an airline in a market
to a certain destination; af > 0. s; is the average number of seats, included in
logarithmic form, as it is also an indication of the "size" of an airline 4. Moreover,
aircraft size can be seen as an indicator of the level of comfort; larger aircraft have
more amenities. We use the average number of seats as a proxy for aircraft size. To
account for decreasing marginal utility of comfort, it is in logarithmic form; a_ > 0. The
systematic utility of using an airport d is given by
4 The "'size" of an airline in an origin-destination market can be represented by St=f_s;. St is best
included in logarithmic from in the utility function; see Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1987. chapter 9) for
details.
+p,d.
(6)
where fld is an airport specific constant, dd is the road distance to the airport; fl, < 0.
The systematic utility of using an access mode a is
I', = _'o+ypp, +y,t +y°c (7)
where Ya is a mode specific constant, po is the cost of the access mode, 7p < 0. to is the
access time to the airport using access mode a; _ < 0 and c stands for personal
characteristics (such as group size, pieces of luggage etc.). ,u < O< 1. When ,u = 0= 1,
the model reduces to the multinomial logit model.
3 The 1995 MTC Airline Passenger Survey
The 1995 Metropolitan Transportation Commission Airline Passenger was conducted
in August and October 1995 at San Francisco International Airport (SFO), San Jose
International Airport (SJC), Oakland International Airport (OAK) and Sonoma County
Airport (STS). Some 21,500 passengers departing from these airports were
interviewed within 45 minutes to 1 hour before take o_ see Table 1 for the
distribution of respondents over the airports.
Table 1 Respondents and total enulaned assen ers
.............................. ,_ p 'g (1995)
Air_..rt San Francisco'" S'-'a'n'Jos'e"T...... -n'_t.,_-"_"-2..... _ ^ _
................................................. •.,,,_,_,u aonoma t.ouatv Total
Respondents 10,454 7,119 ....... "3",,_9:/ ............ 5_1............... ..........
Passengers 15 013 265 4 267.071 . - .
......... •,-............ ............ ...., ............ <50o,o00
1) A disproportionally large number of interviews was conttucte_:l at"S_"J'o_ at'the'request" ot:'the"
airport authorities.
In Table 2 the distribution of respondents over the different access modes is given for
each of the four airports. The majority of the passengers, both business and leisure, use
a car to get to the airport. The percentage of private cars used by visiting passengers is
quite high. This can only be the case if some (most) of these passengers are dropped
off (at theairport).This informationis notavailable;the informationthat is availableis
the numberof peoplethatcameinto the terminalto seethe respondentoff. Henceone
can only expect that more respondents (especially visitors) were dropped off at the
airport and not accompanied into the terminal. This assumption is reinforced by the
fact that a visiting business traveler is more likely to use a rental car than a private car,
while for visiting leisure travelers the reverse holds true.
Compared to SJC, OAK and STS, passengers at SFO use more often the
access modes that are alternatives to the car (though the car, whether private or
rented, is by far the most likely access mode).
Table 2a Shares of._d!fferent access modes (°/o)_,_S_FO
residents visitors
business leisure ..... -----total I ..... business ...... l.e!_r.e ......... t.o..tal.,l. ...
........ : ................... "6=/............ 6i ......... "6-_'i84")'" 14 31 24 (68)
private car
rental car 3
private scheduled 6
public transit 1
door 2 door van 11
hotel courte_.. 1
2 2 (95) 40 29 34 (96)
9 8 (97) 7 7 7 (96)
2 2 (99) l 2 1 (94)
15 13 (98) 13 15 14 (97)
3 2 (97) 7 7 7 (98)
taxi 7 5 6 (97) 12 6 8 (97)
limousine 3 2 2 (.95) 5 3 4 (97)
the terminal to see the respondent off.
Table 2b Shares of different access modes (o_/q, SIC
resid_ents visitors
bus ness leisu=....... ....... ...... ......... :o.9:.....
..... pfivai¢car ........... "8=/............ "81_......... 88 (81) 24 66 43 (66)
rental car 3 1 2 (91) 61 25 46 (94)
private scheduled 1 2 1 (100) 2 2 2 (96)
public transit 0 1 1 (100) 0 l 1 (95)
door 2 door van 2 2 2 (99) 1 1 l (97)
hotel courte_ 0 0 0 (100) 8 2 5 (98)
taxi 5 5 5 (91) 4 2 3 (97)
limousine 2 l 1 (95) l 1 1 (81)
,.. •. o..o • • • _ • • •s.• •m•. _• • •--• • .a • •.• *-• •• • • ••••m• • =•••-•••••_• • m.• il.. • •--••••• •-o • ...o. °°o°o • •°°-•°-° ••_°• •'° *
1) see footnote at Table 2a
Table 2c Shares Of different accex_ modes (%), OAK
residents visitors
business leisure total' htt_ine_ ....leisure totalz
............................................................
private car 87 83 84 (79) 32 62 52 (57)
rental car 2 l I (96) 50 24 33 (93)
private scheduled 2 3 3 (98) 2 3 3 (92)
public transit 3 7 6 (99) 4 4 4 (90)
door 2 door van 3 4 4 (94) 5 3 3 (100)
hotel courtesy. 0 0 0 (I00) 2 I 2 (96)
taxi 2 1 1 (88) 4 2 3 (91)
limousine 1 0 1_00) 0 0 0 (100)
1) see footnote at Table 2a ............
Table 2d Sharesof__d_ifferent access modes(%), STS
residents visitors
......................... bu:3i.n.e.ss"....... le.i..sj_......... ".t._m.'.l'l.'.".:"..."_ "_b.'.u'._n es.s...... leisure total t
private car 83 100 88 (89) 46 86 60 (50)
rental car 8 0 8 (50) 36 14 28 (100)
taxi 4 0 3 (100) 9 0 6 (100)
limousine 4 0 3 (100) 9 0 6(0) ....
1) see comment made under Table 2a
All airports can be reached using public transportation, but whether public
transportation is a likely access mode depends on the city of origin and the airport
used. SFO, SJC and OAK can be reached by rail and bus from some cities, and only by
bus from other cities. In the analysis, rail and bus are joined in the access mode public
transportation; we assume public transportation is available to each passenger. In map
1 the airports, road system and points of origin for the respondents are given.
map I about here
4 Estimation Results
To be able to estimate the model, data on travel times and costs for the different access
modes are necessary. Using a road map of the San Francisco Bay Area 5, access times
using a private car could calculated using the latitude and longitude of the point of
origin and the airports in the system. Access times for the other modes were estimated
as: access time for the private car + 15 minutes for ta.,d, door to door van and rental
s Downloadable from _ww.bts.gov
car and twice the access time using a private car for public transportation. For hotel
courtesy the same access time as for the private car was used. As the information on
whether a respondent using a private car was dropped off or used a (longer term)
parking lot was incomplete, the cost of using a private car was fixed at the cost of a 24
hour parking period. It is noted that for some respondents this may be too high while it
is too low for others. Based on the price information found on different websites of car
rental companies; the cost of using a rental car was set at $50. For the modes taxi,
door to door van and public transportation average costs could be found on the web
for some city-airport pairs. Based on these data, average access costs per mile could be
calculated. These were $2.50 per mile for a taxi, $1.10 per mile for a door to door van
and $1 base + 50.05 per mile for public transportation. Hotel courtesy was assumed
free of charge.
The model as specified in equations (1)-(7) was estimated using FIML. The full
nested structure (with three levels) did not deliver viable results. Moreover, the
statistically preferred model for the joint access mode-airport choice (using the
aggregated frequency and number of seats as explanatory variables for the airport
choice) was a multinomial logit model. Hence the model was restated such that the
passenger first chooses an access mode-airport combination and then an airline.
Estimation results for Bay Area residents are presented in Table 3. The
available access modes are: private car, rental car, door to door van (including private
scheduled) 6, public transportation and taxi (including limousine). In Table 3 rental car
is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the respondent has chosen a rental car
and has used it for other purposes besides driving to the airport. Home is a dummy
variable which takes on the value 1 if the respondent's origin was his/her home. As this
variable has the same values accross all mode-airport combinations, the parameter for
the mode private car was normalized to 0. To avoid multi-collinearity (with the rental
car dummy) the parameter for the mode rental car was also fixed at 0. The parameter
describing the heterogeneity between airlines is made airport specific; 0 < _ < 1.
Airlines are closer substitutes if p is closer to 0.
6 Private scheduled and door to door van are treated as the same access mode, although preferable they
should be treated as different access modes. However, for technical reasons and because the average
costs found on the _eb were in a number of cases given for private scheduled and door to door van
together, they were treated as the same.
Table 3
Estimation results, Ba_ Area residents, AuEust 1995
Business travelers Leisure travelers
Parameter Parameter Standard Error Parameter
Estimate Estimate
Standard Error
In(frequency) 0.85131 0.83694E-01 0.638582 6.'6:/99(_E-0 i .....
In(seats) 1.4555 0.36331 1.6626 0.28511
constant SFO reference reference
SJC 1.0215 0.18486 1.0274 0.16321
OAK 1.4017 0.11968 1.9070 0.91340E-01
access cost -0.38181E-01 0.53941E-02 -0.23268E-01 0.44933E-02
access time -0.88490E-02 0.20696E-02 -0.14344E-0 i 0.16538E-02
rental car 4.6546 1.1512 4.2217 1.2208
home car reference reference
d2d I 1.6569 0.32151 1.6352 0.21016
Pt 2 -0.67739 0.31746 -0.33338 0.20788
taxi 2.1498 0.44677 1.2405 0.42649
/dsFo 0.37446 0.87101E-01 0.47049 0.75418E-01
/Zs_c 0.19857 0.79549E-01 0.36100 0.70909E-01
,tto,4K 0.19797 0.79952E-01 0.32423 0.69882E-01
Log-likelihood - 1864.406 -3145.597
p2 0.46 0.43
observations 794 1278
1) door to door van
2) public transportation
From Table 3 it appears that business travelers are more sensitive to frequency,
but are less sensitive to access time and access cost than leisure travelers. The latter
finding seems to contradict the common finding in the literature that business
passengers are more sensitive to access times than leisure travelers. In the "'business
model" the alternatives within the clusters (clusters constituted of airlines and the same
airport-access mode combination) are closer substitutes than in the leisure model.
Moreover, the alternatives within the clusters not including SFO seem to be closer
substitutes than the alternatives within the clusters including SFO. When a passenger
will use a rental car also for other reasons than going to the airport, the rental car is
more likely to be chosen as the access mode. When leaving from home. business
travelers are more likely to choose a taxi then leisure travelers would. Public
transportation is a less likely access mode when leaving home. Given the access times
(and the maximum expected utilities of the airlines operating from the airports),
passengers seem to prefer SJC and OAK over SFO.
Estimations for Bay Area visitors are presented in Table 4 The available access
modes are: rental car, door to door van, public transportation, taxi and hotel courtesy.
For the leisure travelers, the nested structure was rejected: the bt's were larger than 1
and therefore theoretically not valid Hence for the visiting leisure travelers a
multinomial logit model is preferred. Models including both the access time and access
cost led to theoretically invalid results: the sign for the access cost took on the wrong
value. Hence the estimation results for models with only the access time parameter are
presented.
Table 4 Estimation re_t.lt.s., Ba_y...Area.visit.ors, Au_.tst.19.95. ...........................
.......................... "13usiness travelers Leisure travelers
Parameter Parameter Standard Error Parameter Standard Error
Estimate Estimate ......
lni / q/id/, yi ........ ........... b'9 8 9i :i5i...... ............. b 8" 8"8i :i51
1.2276 0.46122 1.9627 0.40400
re_rence re_rence
0.77813 1.4608 0.18818
0.73498 0.88862 0.13066
-0.16871E-01 0.19857E-02 -046228E-01 0.27616E-02
re_rence re, fence
0.86428 0.15405
-0.61566 0.27081
0.35715 0.44644
1.6708 0.18228
0.29157 0.81419E-01
0.13424 0.70440E-01
0.13363 0.71660E-01
-2049.64
0.42
1.3923 0.18354
1.3169 0.26878
0.65484 0.32571
0.50547 0.14175
-1579.871
0.44
In(seats)
constant SFO
SJC
OAK
access time
hotel hotel !
rent 2
d2d 3
pd
taxi
l.tsFo
/.tsJc
flo, oc
Log-likelihood
p2
656
observations 813 ...................................
1) hotel courtesy
2) rental car
3) door to door van
4) public transportation
The parameters for the frequency and seats in the business model do not differ that
much from the business model for the residents: the estimates fall within each other's
95*/o confidence interval Like in the model for the residents, the alternatives within the
clusters not including SFO seem to be closer substitutes than the alternatives within the
iclusters including SFO. For the leisure travelers, a multinomial Iogit model is preferred,
in which there are no clusters and no perfect substitutes. Because of the different
model structures, the parameters are difficult to compare.
5 Conclusion
In this paper discrete choice models describing the access mode-airport-airline choice
were estimated. In a simplified model describing the access mode-aiport choice the
nested structure first airport, then airline, which Bondzio (1996) found to be the
preferred model for business passengers in Germany, was rejected in favour of a
multinomial logit model. Hence the model describing the access mode-airport-airline
choice has two levels. First the access mode and airport are chosen simultaneously,
based on access mode and airport characteristics and the maximum expected utility
from the airlines available from each access mode-airport combination. Next. the
airline is chosen. This structure was statistically preferable to the multinomial logit
model for both resident business and leisure travelers. For resident passengers (both
business and leisure), access times and access costs were significant in the access
mode-airport choice. For visiting passengers (both leisure and business) on the other
hand, models with the access time were preferred.
An interesting finding is that the alternatives (airlines) available from the
clusters including Oakland International Airport or San Jose International Airport are
closer substitutes than the alternatives available from San Francisco International
Airport. This may be due to the fact that, in general, there are more airlines available to
a given destination than from the other three airports.
The following research agenda follows from this paper. First and foremost,
more research has to be done to be able to derive more reliable access times and costs.
Second, airfares should be included in the analysis.
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INTRODUCTION
The premise of this paper is that the antiquated methods of managing airport
pavements and facilities must be discarded and that new, innovative methods of
integrating information between departments could be implemented to more effectively
manage the airport as a system. These better methods will result in both cost savings from
better management, as well as in operational savings to the users of the airports. These
methods gill also provide airport managers with the tools to better plan and manage the
facilities with respect to the true cost of ownership. Geographical Information Systems
and precise satellite positioning systems are the integrating technology to accomplish this
task.
This paper also recommends that the 1970s Pavement Condition Index method
adopted by the Federal Aviation Administration for airport pavement management not be
used for airports with significant commercial service. GIS provides a far better method to
geographically track distresses and other data, and can provide much better tools for
evaluating and predicting pavement performance. This paper also recommends that
precise positioning be used with differential Global Positioning System (D-GPS) to
collect the locations of several pavement attributes for spatial analyses.
Finally this paper describes an ideal airport pavement management system and an
Enhanced Pavement Management System (EPMS) that factors into maintenance
strategies the true costs associated with user delays for various sections of pavement.
WHAT IS GIS?
Geographical Information Systems are computer systems that provide
functionality to collect, manage, display and analyze geospatially-referenced data and its
related attribute data. Computer-aided-Draining (CAD) provides graphical drawings of
objects in 2 or 3 dimensional reference space. CAD can also be augmented in what is
often termed "Smart-CAD", to attach relational database links to drawing objects
permitting one to extract stored information on the object. However, GIS takes Smart-
CAD one step further by providing the capability to analyze objects relative to their geo-
referenced locations in space and to other objects. Spatial analysis provides the ability to
analyze which objects (e.g. dwellings) lie within any specified or calculated distance of
any other object (e.g. underground utility feature).
GIS SURVEY
In 1994, 1995 and 1997, surveys were mailed to airports certified for air carrier or
air taxi operations in the United States to determine if GIS, for any number of
applications, were in use or was planned for use within the next three years. The details
of the first survey were reported in a conference sponsored by the Urban and Regional
Information Systems Association, and are available on the World Wide Web._ In each of
three surveys, the majority of airports which returned surveys either had plans to use GIS
within three years or were actually using GIS for one or more applications. Each of
airports reported approximately the same proportion of GIS use as shown in Figure I.
The survey also ascertained the number and types of applications actually used
and planned for use at each of the airports. Generally, applications primarily fell into two
main categories. Applications related to environmental analysis, management or
compliance, such as noise and clean water issues, or they related to infrastructure or
facility management. The surveys and selected interviews revealed that in most cases GIS
implementation is based upon a funded need for a specific application, such as noise
mitigation, which requires managing 5000 properties or the installation of a noise
monitoring system. Other implementations of GIS driven by specific applications
included underground utility surveys, pavement management surveys and management of
lease space.
The conclusions reached from the surveys were that most airports are either using
or planning for use GIS within three years. The survey also revealed tremendous demand
for the growth of airport GIS, that airports with GIS all have plans to add more
applications and that there is need for education and cooperation among airports relative
to GIS technologies.
McNerney, M. T., "The Use of Geographical Information Systems at U.S. Airports,"
Proceedings, 1994 Annual Conference of the Urban & Regional Information Systems
Association, August 1994, copy available at http:/www.utexas.edu/research/ctr/aviation.
The major premise behind MicroPAVER is that the decline in PCI (100 points
minus total deduction points) indicates over time the need for maintenance, repair and
rehabilitation. If MicroPAVER or the PCI is used to predict remaining life, major
problems can be overlooked and extremely poor predictions are possible. At major hub
airports where runway utilization is critical and aircraft delay due to congestion is
measurable, MicroPAVER as a management tool will end up costing far more money
than it saves.
There are several potential failure modes of airfield pavements that the PCI does
not address because it is only a surface distress measurement. Failures due to the
deterioration of the subsurface materials, failure due to surface profile, or failure due to
fatigue of concrete are not adequately addressed in the PCI method. Structural behavior
of the pavement to load is not considered in the MicroPAVER analysis. Even the
accumulation and distribution patterns of aircraft traffic are not even considered in a
remaining life analysis using MicroPAVEK, only a change in PCI relative to time.
There are technical limitations within the precise measuring method, such as
repairing a small joint spall with a small patch, which results in increasing the total
deductions on the pavement. Other technical limitations have been raised about
combining multiple distresses, failure to record fatigue cracking less than 3ram in crack
width, and high deductions for patching.
Pavement Condition Index essentially reduces all pavement sections to a single
number. It essentially says that if a pavement drops below a certain number it is in need
of rehabilitation. Pavement performance is not that simple, and decisions on a billion
dollars of replacement cost should not be made on PCI simplifications.
IDEAL AIRPORT PAVEMENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
The ideal pavement management system not only can analyze several different
failure modes of airfield pavements, but also can track by geographical location all
pavement discrepancies. If maintenance forces or a contractor installs a patch, the exact
location is noted and the pertinent information to track the longevity of that patch is now
captured for the life span of the facility. If a pattern develops of premature failure in one
specific patching technique or material, the GIS has the data to analyze the problem,
predict the magnitude and develop and rehabilitation strategy.
Determining the exact point of failure of pavement materials is usually not a
simple decision, partly because pavements seldom collapse like a bridge or building. This
debate goes back to a famous highway field test in the 1950s, which was conducted to
determine empirical pavement life data. At some point engineers determined the
pavement failed because of all the cracking. Other engineers, however, argued that more
trucks could safely negotiate the pavement, therefore it was still serviceable. This
difference of opinion lead to the development of the present serviceability concept of
failure in highway pavements that bases failure not on cracking but on passenger riding
quality. However, since aircraft ride quality is still a topic of research and is not the
primary means of determining serviceability or failure at this time, there is not a direct
transfer from highway pavements.
The PCI method assumes the only failure mode is that too much maintenance will
be required in the future. The PCI method rewards early maintenance actions especially
any maintenance action that paints over any surface distress. If maintenance actions are to
shown in Figure 2, the operations and maintenance departments can share data to benefit
each other. For example, in the United States at an air carrier airport, operations
personnel are responsible for daily inspections of runway and taxiway pavements, to
search for discrepancies which might cause aircraft damage or disruption. These are
recorded in logs and later maintenance work is assigned to make immediate or future
repairs to these discrepancies. When repairs are to be made, maintenance personnel must
coordinate with operations personnel to have permission to close the taxiway or runwayto aircraft traffic.
In nearly every airport in the United States, neither operations personnel nor
maintenance personnel can access the other's database, nor does either have the precise
location information of the discrepancy. In my experience, this cross-coordination is
usually attempted by telephone or radio and is often poorly communicated. Maintenance
crews and contractors approved for repair work often have difficulty locating precise
areas on a runway or taxiway. Significant anecdotal evidence exists about repair crews
who conduct tests or core samples or make repairs in the wrong precise location but the
right general area.
By having Differential Global Positioning System in operations and maintenance
vehicles and GIS information available to the vehicles, inspectors and maintenance
personnel can determine several types of information. They can determine if a pattern of
previous discrepancies is occurring; if and when a discrepancy was previously reported;
when it is scheduled for remedy; what windows of opportunity exist for runway or
taxiway closure; and what other runway or taxiway closures are scheduled. GIS serves as
the tool for integrating operations and maintenance data that is geographically tagged to a
specific location. Later the pavement management section can also review this history of
data to determine if there is an underlying reason for this pattern of discrepancies. By
analyzing environmental data, aircraft loading history and pavement construction history
by geographical location, a pavement management system can be a much better predictor
of future problems. Significant resources can be saved if the root cause if the problem is
determined and remedied rather than continuous treating of the symptoms.
LIMITATIONS OF TRADITIONAL PAVEMENT EVALUATION
In the 1970s the U.S. Air Force developed a repeatable method of calculating a
pavement condition index (PCI) that considered only surface distress of airfield
pavements. The purpose of the index was to develop a method to assist in the allocation
of maintenance funds among several different airfields. This system calculated a total
deduction value, which was then subtracted from 100 points for a perfect pavement. In
those times, computer power was limited to a mainframe computer and the distresses
were all reduced to deduction values based upon the density of distress observed, the
severity of distress and the relative importance of the distress to remaining life as
determined by a survey of maintenance engineers. Because of the limitations on
computing power, the actual types of distresses are not considered only the deduction
value of the distresses. In the 1980s the Air Force updated the PAVER program to run on
microcomputers, and therefore renamed the software MicroPAVER. Soon, the Federal
Aviation Administration endorsed MicroPAVER as an acceptable pavement management
system for airfield pavements. Unfortunately, some of the world's busiest airports still
believe that MicroPAVER is an acceptable pavement management tool at their airport.
Robert Harrison and Michael McNerney 2"3 have proposed that the full costs of the
operational impacts be calculated for all critical sections of pavement and used to justify
exotic rehabilitation options when the delay costs indicate savings. They call this an
Enhanced Pavement Management System (EPMS) that provides better management of
assets and less user delays. An Enhanced PMS is location-driven and is best implemented
with GIS technology and integrated with delay modelling such as SIMMOD.
Currently, no airport is actively developing a formal enhanced PMS. Some
airports are using delay costs to analyze alternative reconstruction schedules, for example
comparing closing a runway every night for two years to total closure for six months.
However, using the Integrated Airport GIS technology and an effective pavement
management system, provides the foundation for an Enhanced PMS.
Airport pavement engineers are struggling to do what is best for the airport and at
the busiest airports EPMS would provide tools that will save the airlines money in the
r, the Ion -range spending forecast of an airline is probably only 6 to 12
long run. Howeve.. g .............. ,,!,, endured the first step of actually
months. However, there are airportsmat nave ,ut v,,,j .
implementing GIS technology for pavement management. There are at least two atrports
that are endorsing the integrated airport GIS concept of an integrated information
management system with geospatial components.
EXAMPLES OF AIRPORTS DEVELOPING INTEGRATED AIRPORT GIS
Orlando International Airport
David Tamir of the Greater Orlando Aviation Authority has the charge of
developing an information management system that manages the configuration of the
airport in all respects. In his recently published paper, 4 he states that the technical
information management system includes a geographical information system as a major
part of the overall system. CAD is also integrated into the overall system. The system is
currently in the first stage of development and is likely to have a pavement management
component.
Inchon International Airport, South Korea
Inchon International Airport is a new airport under construction as a replacement
to Kimpo International Airport in Seoul, Korea. The airport construction phase includes a
design for a modern networked information management system which is essentially an
2 McNerney, M. T. and Robert Harrison, "Full-Cost Approach to Airport Pavement
Management," _mics F'_st Edition, Darryl Jenkins Editor,
McGraw-Hill, 1995, pp. 121-130, copy available at
http:/www.utexas.edu/research/ctr/aviati°n "Enhanced Pavement Management
3 McNerney, Michael T., and Robert Harrison,
Systems for Airports: A Full Cost Analysis of Operational Impacts," 25 th International
Air Transportation Conference Proceedings, ASCE, Reston, VA, June 1998, pp.496-510.
4 Tamir, David, G. Draper and R. Osborne, "Airport Configuration Management Using a
Technical Information Mapping System (TIMS)," 25 th International Air Transportation
Conference Proceedings," ASCE, Reston, VA, June 1998, pp. 303-318.
be considered as a failure mode, it is best to track the maintenance actions by geographic
location, analyze the causes, and predict future requirement based upon scientific
investigation rather than on a number between 1 and 100.
In one busy airport, a certain highly trafficked taxiway required the full attention
of one or more maintenance crews every night. Maintenance had no system to track how
much time and money was being spent on specific locations of highly trafficked sections
and consequently waited far too long to convince the engineering department to let a
contract for replacement of the concrete slabs. As anecdotal evidence that differences of
opinions still exist today about remaining life, an engineer in another department stated
that he agreed that the taxiway had reached failure, but the runway still had a long way to
go to reach that failure. The maintenance foreman replied that if that engineer proposed
to let the runway deteriorate to the same extent as that taxiway, he was willing to quit
now. The maintenance department without the system to track locations of discrepancies
and maintenance action by precise location can not successfully argue for adequate
budgets or prepare plans for timely rehabilitation or reconstruction.
The ideal pavement management system will use DGPS to precisely locate and
track individual discrepancies, repairs, core samples, deflection measurements, and
subgrade strength measurements. It will have the ability to track non-pavement data such
as aircraft traffic by aircraft type, airport drainage patterns, future rehabilitation or
reconstruction projects by exact location and schedule. Using this avement m
system, control sections can be ,-_r,_g,wl..... :..... ,. P _ anagement
.... •-...... ,y ,,,u,Jtorea as lnazcators of potential problemsoerore they occur.
The traditional method of PCI starts with a clean sheet of paper each year for field
measurement. If the exact locations and descriptions and distress types are geographically
located in the pavement management computer, the annual update can be accomplished
much faster by comparing the previous data to actual existing conditions. If one of the
thousands of patches on a runway were previously located by DGPS, it probably has not
moved; what is important on this inspection is how the patch is performing. Also an
inspection with automatic location by DGPS and computer input in the field has less
chance for errors than a manual system that transcribes field notes.
Taking another step forward into the 1990s can enhance ideal pavement
management with the consideration of the actual dollar amount of user cost associated
with delays caused by runway and taxiway closures. Currently, airport pavement
engineers do not have a tool to measure the actual importance of any particular section of
pavement with respect to operational priority. Currently, the maintenance and
engineering personnel usually use the test of importance of a pavement section as best
measured by how loud the operations department or airlines scream when he asks to close
it for a while. In fact, the operations patterns of an airport change due to weather
conditions, seasonal changes, and weekly and hourly scheduling variations. Certain
portions of a long runway could be shut down for days without an operational impact if it
was known that the wind patterns would require takeoffs and landings to a certaindirection.
PERCENT GIS USE AT RESPONDING
AIRPORTS
NO USE ACTUAL USE
42% 25%
PLANNED USE WITHIN
36 MONTHS 19%
PLANNED USE
WITHIN 12
MONTHS 15%
Figure 1. Percent of GIS use at Airports Responding to Survey
The most common scenario of Airport GIS implementation is a single desktop
system purchased for a single application. This is common because money was likely
available for that specific application. Often, certain types of federal grant funds or
Airport Improvement Program (AIP) Funds were available for the specific purpose that a
GIS could be justified. Later, as the system started to prove its usefulness, other
departments wanted to add other applications to the installed system. Usually, these are
added later, often to a system not designed for the necessary expansion and without a
database to accommodate the new applications. This is not necessarily the best solution,
and the author proposes that an Airport GIS be designed from the beginning as an
integrated airport information system, not merely as a tool for a specific application.
INTEGRATED AIRPORT GIS
Most accountants look at GIS and determine a cost-benefit analysis must be made
in order to justify the high cost of implementation. However, when only one specific
application is intended, the cost of implementing a new system from scratch seems hard
to justify, simply on projected savings in budgetary dollars. In these types of traditional
cost-benefit comparisons, only applications that affect the airport's revenue stream (lease
space, utility customers, etc) seem to be justified on first inspection. However, the true
power of a GIS is the ability to integrate data from many different sources. Several case
studies at airports and municipalities have cited examples where significant savings
resulted from the rapid solution to a crisis problem used GIS technology, and otherwise
would not have been solved as quickly or efficiently. Often it is a problem that was never
even considered when the GIS was designed. It is hard to capture the value of the GIS
problem-solving potential and value gained from having readily accessible data from a
traditional cost-benefit analysis. Many people have reported that 80 percent of the cost of
GIS implementation is not the hardware, software or training, but the capture of the data.
In an unconventional cost benefit analysis, one should also consider the benefit gained by
capturing useful data that otherwise would be lost.
An Integrated Airport GIS should be designed from the beginning to be a full
service information system that shares data over networked computers for multiple
applications and multiple users. Each department is responsible for the accuracy and
maintenance of their data. In Figure 2, the concept of an integrated airport GIS is shown
with the middle of the figure indicating some of the assets and their geographical
boundaries that are shared between departments.
Figure 2. Concept of an Integrated Airport GIS
Examples of potential data sharing between different departments within an
airport are numerous and this paper will concentrate on the pavement management and
infrastructure management improvements that can made using an integrated GIS. As
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Summary
This paper addresses recent model development by DGCA and Hague Consulting Group
concerning long-distance travel. Long-distance travel demand is growing very quickly
and raising a great deal of economic and policy issues. There is increasing competition
among the main Western European airports, and smaller, regional airports are fighting
for market share. New modes of transport, such as high speed rail, are also coming into
the picture and affect the mode split for medium distance transport within Europe.
Developments such as these are demanding the attention of policy makers and a tool is
required for their analysis. For DGCA, Hague Consulting Group has developed a model
system to provide answers to the policy questions posed by these expected trends, and
to identify areas where policy makers can influence the traveller choices. The
development of this model system, the Integrated Airport Competition Modelllntegraal
Luchthcn'en Competitie Model (ILCM), began in 1992. Since that time the sub-models,
input data and user interface have been expanded, updated and improved. HCG and
DGCA have transformed the ILCM from a prototype into an operational forecasting
tool.
1. Introduction
The growth of air traffic at Dutch airports is a hotly debated issue in current national
politics. In particular, limits on the capacity growth of Amsterdam Airport Schiphol
pose a major problem because of excessive demand. Recently the Dutch government
made the decision to build a new (fifth) runway. The essential question now is whether
Schiphol can handle the future growth within the agreed environmental restrictions or if
a new airport is needed.
Another large transport infrastructure project is the construction of high-speed rail lines.
The government recently made the decision to build one of these (between Amsterdam
and Antwerp, connecting to Brussels, Paris and London) and others may follow. The
government is currently in search of private investors in order to the public costs of this
new infrastructure. These rail lines will include a stop at Schiphol Airport and could
have significant impact on long-distance travel flows to specific destinations. Policy-
makers recognise that changes in one transport mode affect each of the others. This is
integrated Airport GIS that encompasses nearly all departments. This integrated airport
GIS is being developed to be fully operational on the opening day as a
facility/infrastructure management and operational management tool. The cost of this
geographical information system as the primary information system of the airport is
estimated over 15 million dollars. The integrated Airport GIS will include a pavement
management system.
These are two examples of how airports are looking into the future and are
developing airport-wide information systems that allow infrastructure and facility
management and have geospatial analysis capability. There may be other airports that are
also adopting this philosophy as well. Dallas/Worth International Airport has made a
major change in policy and organization by creating a new position and hiring a Chief
Information Officer at the Director level.
Recently, the American Association of Airport Executives held the first ever
Airport GIS Workshop in Snowbird, Utah. The workshop was highly successful and
AAAE plans to make the Airport GIS Workshop an annual event. The participants of the
workshop were so enthused about Airport GIS that it was decided that an Airport GIS
committee of AAA would be formed to help promote the implementation of GIS at
airports.
In comparison to state highway departments and municipalities in the United
States, airports are getting a late start in GIS technology. One of the reasons for this may
be the FAA and airline oversight of budgets. However, state highways departments and
many municipalities typically report substantial savings in many GIS applications
including pavement and infrastructure management. It is only a matter of time and
education until airports begin to implement GIS technology in a big way.
.due to competition as well as complementarity between modes. It is important to
consider these interactions when developing new transport policy and planning tools.
The ILCM was developed in response to policy questions about the future of air
transport in the Netherlands. It is based on several sub-models that act as building
blocks for a comprehensive system. These sub-models correspond to each stage of the
decision process for a long distance trip and include airport access mode choice,
airport/air route choice, main mode choice and trip frequency models. The airport/air
route and main mode choice models have recently been updated and calibrated.
The current ILCM is the result of a continuous process of improvements of the
prototype system that is described in earlier papers (Bradley, et al 1992, Veldhuis, et al
1995). This paper gives, an overview of the model structure, the sub-models and some
examples of possible applications of the system.
2. Structure
2.1 ILCM behavioural assumptions
Before a traveller undertakes a long distance trip, he or she makes a series of decisions.
The ILCM assumes that a decision chain, illustrated in Figure 1, can reasonably
represent these choices. Each decision in the chain is represented in the ILCM by a
choice model.
• The first choice a potential traveller makes is whether to make the trip or not. This
is represented by a trip frequency model in the ILCM.
• Next, he or she decides either to fly or use another mode, such as car, train or coach.
This is dealt with in the mare mode choice model.
• If a traveller decides to fly, he can often choose either a direct flight or a route that
involves a transfer. Related to this is the choice between different departure airports
in the area. Each airport may have different accessibility, availability of parking
places, frequency of flights, etc. This part of the system is called the air route
choice model.
• Finally, the traveller can go to the airport by public transport, by taxi, by driving and
parking at the airport, or be dropped off by friends, family or colleagues. This choice
is represented in the access mode choice model.
In the ILCM, all these dimensions of the choice process are combined in a coherent
manner. A change in the frequency of flights from a certain airport, for instance, can
affect all choices in the decision chain, either directly (air route and/or main mode
choice) or indirectly (access mode via the choice of another departure airport).
Figure 1: Decisionchain for longdistancetravel
travel not travel
car air rail coach
Amsterdam Amsterdam Rotterdam etc.
direct via London via London
etc. etc.
drive ride taxi train/bus
HSR
Trip frequency model
Main mode choice model
Route choice model
Access mode choice model
In order to model the choices of travellers potentially making use of Schiphol Airport,
the ILCM includes a market area that extends beyond the borders of the Netherlands to
include Belgium and parts of western Germany. Brussels and Dusseldorf airports are
likewise included as airports which compete for travellers with origins and/or
destinations in the Netherlands.
2.2 The theory behind the ILCM
The structure of the ILCM is based on the fact that a traveller has to make a series of
decisions before he or she actually makes a long distance trip. These decisions are not
independent. The ILCM is a combination of models such that the choice at a lower level
will influence the choices at higher levels. This is modelled by a nested or tree logit
structure. The theory behind this type of modelling is described in Ben-Akiva and
Lerman (1985).
The basic assumption of multinomial logit models is that people choose the option, for
example the access mode, that gives them maximum utility. For each available access
mode, a utility function is determined. Utility functions are assumed to be of the form
U'CC_'(i) = ct + 13*Cost + 8*Time + c'Age + qb*Sex + rl*Travel Purpose + ........
The probability of choosing alternative i in Logit modelling can be written as:
P(i) = Exp(U"_"(i)) / Y.i Exp(U'°°_'(j))
where U(i) is the utility function of alternative i and summation Zj is over all alternativesj.
The person and travel characteristics which are to be included in the utility function are
In the nested model structure (shown in Figure 1), each choice lower down the 'tree' is
conditional on the choice above it. The attractiveness of the alternatives for that choice
also affects the choice that will be made above it.
The levels in the tree structure influence each other. Improvement of public transport
access to regional airports, for instance, not only implies that more people who already
travel via a regional airport will choose public transport as an access mode (direct
effect). Also the number of travellers via regional airports will increase (first order
effect), and to a lesser extent the number of air travellers overall will go up (second
order effect).
This interaction between the choice levels is included in the model structure through so-
called logsums. The logsum is a measure of the overall attractiveness of all alternatives
at a given level of the tree structure and is computed as the logarithm of the sum of the
exponential utilities:
Log(El Exp(U(i))).
In the route choice model, logsums are included from the access mode choice model for
each airport. Thus, the utility function for, for instance, travel via Rotterdam airport, is
described as:
U_O_C(Rotterdam) = ot + [3*Log(Ei Exp(U'C°"(i))) + 5*Time + e'Cost + ........
where Y_ is over all access modes and Ua_:=_(i) is the utility of travelling to Rotterdam
airport using access mode i. Thus, if public transport access to Rotterdam airport is
improved, U'_'(i) increases for i=public transport; consequently the logsum for access
to Rotterdam goes up, which increases the value ofU'*C(Rotterdam) -
The interaction between the main mode choice model and the air route choice model is
taken care of in the same way. Logsums are used for travel via all airports and using all
available air routes, giving a utility function for air travel:
l.j_i"(Alr) = ot + 13*Log(Ei Exp(W°_(i))) + 5*Time + e*Cost + ........
In this application, _Ei is over all air routes and U'_(i) is the utility of travelling by air
via route i (including departure airport choice). This means that if (for instance) tickets
via Maastricht airport become cheaper, travel to all destinations by way of direct and
indirect flights from U"U*'(Maastr icht) becomes more attractive. Also, if (for example)
tickets with a transfer at London are sold at lower prices, air becomes more attractive
through U_Ut'(via London) for all departure airports and all final destinations. In the
previous example where public transport access to Rotterdam airport is improved,
l_Vu*_(Rotterdam) increases and thus U"Ui"(Air) also goes up.
The final interaction is that between the total number of trips and overall attractiveness
of all main modes. The choice between travelling or not travelling is at this phase of the
ILCM not made through logit modelling. The current ILCM models frequency by use
of a fixed elasticity-based model that includes an elasticity for generalised cost.
whereT._ is over all main modes, U_a"(i) is the utility of main mode i and s is the main
mode choice model cost coefficient (e < 0). Improved overall accessibility (e.g.
through the introduction of high speed rail, more frequent flights etc.) means that the
generalised cost of travel decreases since s < O. The elasticities therefore have the same
sign as the cost coefficient to assure that a higher attractiveness of travel means that the
number of trips increases. An elasticity value of, say, -0.3 means that if the generalised
costs increase by 10 percent, the number of trips decreases by 3 percent. Another
element of the frequency model is growth based on economic variables.
Recalling the example of improving access to Rotterdam Airport, this would decrease
generalised costs through higher values of U_(Access), U'Om(Rotterdam) and
U'_in(Air), respectively. It is important to realise that the influence of a change at a
certain level of the decision chain has the largest influence on the choice made at that
level. The effect on higher level choices decreases with each step higher in the chain.
Thus, improvement of public transport access to Rotterdam airport has the largest effect
on access mode choice to Rotterdam airport, a smaller but usually measurable effect on
the number of trips via Rotterdam airport, an even smaller effect on the number of air
trips overall. The least amount of effect will be on the number of long distance trips
made by all modes.
The models were estimated separately starting at the bottom of the tree (see Figure 1)
with the access models. The process of finding the optimal set of parameters is carried
out using HCG's estimation package ALOGIT. Various data sources were used for this
estimation. These are described in later sections of this paper.
2.3 Description of the models
Access mode choice models
The airport access mode choice models were estimated based the actual choice observed
in the 1991 Schiphol survey data. For the estimation of access mode choice models for
travel to the airport, nine different segments were distinguished, each having their own
'typical' travel behaviour. Five categories were developed for 'residents' (those living in
the hinterland of Schiphol) and four for non-residents:
HmterlaJM residents (Benehtx arm west of
Germatw) :
Business (trips longer than 2 days)
Short Business
Vacation
Other Purposes
Charter
Other travellers from Europe/1CA :
Business (trips longer than 2 days)
Short Business
Vacation
Other Purposes
For each of these segments, separate access mode choice models were estimated. In the
access mode choice models, four mode alternatives were included. They differ by
residents and non-residents:
° .
Residents"
Car Drop-off (car passenger)
Car Parked (car driver)
Taxi
Public Transport/high speed rail*
Non Residents"
Car Drop-off
Rental Car
Taxi
Public Transport/high speed rail*
*airport access by high-speed rail (HSR) is only possible for specific airports when main
mode choice is air.
The most important variables in the choice between modes are usually travel cost and
travel time. All costs in these models are based on distance except for parking, which is
based on duration of stay at the destination. The costs of a rental car are not included,
since it is assumed that the car will mainly be used for trips other than to and from the
airport. The main explanatory variables are:
. The number of flights a traveller has made during the previous months has a
negative influence on the choice of the car passenger alternative and a positive
influence on the taxi and car driver alternatives.
• Flying to an intercontinental destination or st_.ing away a large number of days has
a negative influence on the choice for train. Too many bags to carry might be the
underlying ieason. For the choice of car drop-off, this influence is positive.
• Women are less likely to use a car and, for the 'short' market segments, more likely
to be dropped-off at the airport than men.
• There is a strong dependence between age and the use of taxi: the older the traveller,
the more likely that he or she will travel to the airport by taxi. This effect is especially
significant for the non-business segments. People over 50 are relatively often taken to
the airport. People under 30 are more likely to use train and less likely to use ear.
• Scandinavian visitors use taxi relatively often. Visitors from the United Kingdom,
however, are more likely to use train. Taxi is more likely to be used by business
travellers.
The values of travel time inferred from the estimated model are quite high for both
business and non-business travellers. This result is typical for airport access models,
since the cost of the access trip is quite small compared to the potential cost of being
late for the flight.
Air route choice models
This model assumes that the destination airport is fixed and predicts the choice of air
route to that destination, including the choice of departure airport and possibly a transfer
airport. Because there was no data available in the Netherlands to estimate such model,
a stated preference survey was carried out in 1992 at Amsterdam, Eindhoven and
Brussels airports. The survey provided data to estimate models of the choice of
departure airport and air route (direct vs. transfer) as a function of fare, frequency,
travel time, access time, etc. In the SP route choice data, respondents often had the
nl.,-,;,-,_ 1._,_*,,,,_,_r_ tr_x,ollinc, ¢'rr_r,n tho _rtltzl clon_rtl_ro _imnrt nr _witchin_c, tn zn ahemative
airportto takeadvantage of a better or cheaper flight. The SP experiment and analysis
are described in some detail in Bradley (1994).
Although we expect the SP data to give the best estimates of the relative importance of
the variables (e.g. fare versus frequency), SP and RP data typically show different
overall sensitivities (the scale of" the coefficients), as well as different residual constants.
It was therefore necessary to calibrate the models as much as possible to RP route
choice data.
The access mode choice models are linked to the route choice models by a logsum
variable that is the composite utility of access to a given airport across all available
access modes.
Air route choice models were estimated for seven different market segments. Both
business and non-business segments are split into "short" (major nearby destinations
such as Paris, Frankfurt, London, Manchester and Copenhagen), the rest of Europe and
intercontinental (ICA). Charter trips form the seventh segment.
The main variables in the model are:
• Fare: A linear coefficient per guilder, highly significant in all the models. The
coefficient tends to decrease with journey distance, but is always 3 to 4 times as high
for non-business as for business• The charter coefficient is even higher still when
compared to the non-business Europe coefficient.
Frequem.y: The logarithm of the frequency per week. For transfer routes, the lowest
frequency of the two flights is used. The effect is strongest for the shortest routes,
and stronger for business than non-business - particularly relative to fare.
Journey time: The in-flight time plus 3 times the transfer wait time. Because there
was not enough variation between flight times in the SP data to estimate a significant
effect in most of the segments, the ratio of 1 to 3 was determined from the segments
where an effect could be estimated (i.e., the transfer wait time is perceived to be 3
times as onerous as in-flight time). This is also similar to the ratio often estimated for
wait time relative to in-vehicle time in other modes. For the short and charter flights,
no effect could be estimated. For the other segments, journey time is more important
for business than for non-business.
Transfer dummy: Transfer routes are significantly less preferred than direct ones,
even after accounting for the in-flight and wait time differences. The effect is only
slightly higher for business than for non-business.
Airport constants: Since we are using SP data from a choice-based sample, the
constants will need to be recalibrated, so the results here are not critical. The
constants for the various airports relative to Schiphol are not significant in most
cases, and do not show any marked trend across the segments.
Access model logsums: For application, all logsum coefficients should be in the
theoretically valid range of 0 to 1.0. For some segments, the iogsum coefficient had
to be constrained to 1.
Our surveysamplecontains 985 observed choices of airports and air routes. Using
those choices, an RP model was estimated of the choice between a direct or transfer
route from either Amsterdam, Eindhoven or Brussels airport. In addition, information
on passenger volumes at the different airports within the Hinterland was used to ensure
a realistic distribution of passengers among these airports. This information was
provided by DGCA and the CBS report 'Statistiek van de Luchtvaart' (1994).
The airport/air route models were adjusted at several levels prior to implementation. The
models for the Business Short and Non-business Short segments do not have
coefficients for journey time or transfer dummy. No observations in these segments
transferred during their trips by air, which is to be expected, and so no transfer dummy
could be estimated. While an effort was made to estimate journey time coefficients for
these segments, the results were not significant. It is desirable to include journey time
and a transfer dummy in these models so that future policy and network changes have an
effect on air travel in these segments. Therefore, in the ILCM application, the values of
time estimated in the Business Europe and Non-business Europe segment models were
used together with the fare coefficients in the Business Short and Non-business Short
segments to estimate journey time coefficients: Similarly, the "values" of transfers in the
Europe segments were used to estimate transfer dummies for the Short segments.
-_7 Main mode choice models
In 1995 HCG investigated a source of information called the European Travel Monitor
(ETM). The ETM is a collection of different surveys across Europe and includes trip-
level information across purposes, travel modes and destinations. Because of
inconsistencies between these surveys and the very high cost of the data, HCG and
DGCA obtained only the data concerning long-distance trips made by residents of the
Netherlands in 1994. In theory the ETM files obtained by HCG include a representative
sample of these trips. Because of serious interpretation problems it was not possible to
determine the proper weighting of the records. However, there were enough
unweighted observations to proceed with estimating main mode choice models.
As described earlier, the access models are linked to the route choice models, and the
route choice models are linked to the main mode choice models. The link from the
route choice models to the main mode choice models consists of a logsum term for the
airport/air route choice.
Separate main mode choice models were estimated for four market segments:
• Business Short: business trips to London, Paris, and nearby portions of Germany
• Business Europe: business trips to the rest of Europe
• Non-business Short: non-business trips to London, Paris and nearby portions of
Germany
• Non-business Europe: non-business trips to the rest of Europe
These are the same market segments for which airport/air route choice models were
estimated, with the exception that no models were estimated for business or non-
business travel to intercontinental destinations. The reason for this is that travellers to
these destinations are assumed to have no main mode choice: they must travel by air.
Fourmainmodealternativesareoffered:
* air or HSR (highly competitive, high quality connections - see section 2.4)
• train (low comfort level)
• car
• coach
Some assumptions had to be made to incorporate the attractiveness of charter flights
into the models, because it is not clear when the air alternative is charter for a given
destination. According to the Schiphol survey, the main charter destinations are Spain,
Portugal and Greece. For estimation purposes it was assumed that all non-business trips
to these destinations fall under the charter route choice segment. A separate logsum
coefficient for charter was necessary to deal with the fact that the charter and scheduled
air route choice logsumsare of different orders of magnitude.
Almost all of the important destinations in Europe for trips from the Netherlands have
unique characteristics that are determining factors for mode choice. Because the UK is
an island, a much larger share of trips with UK destinations use air as main mode than
might be expected on the basis of, say, distance. France is an important destination for
particular types of holidays, such as camping. This is reflected in the dominant use of
the car as main mode. Car is more important for very long distance trips (to southern
France, for example) than might be expected. Non-business trips to Switzerland and
Austria are clustered in the winter, which is to be expected. Again more of these trips
are made by car than would be expected on the basis of distance. It may be that because
winter destinations tend to be far from airports and that a high number of local train
transfers are required (with sports equipment being carried), many traveUers choose to
use a car.
The main variables in the main mode models are:
Air route logsum: Theoretically for application the logsum coefficient should be in
between 0.0 and 1.0. For non-business the coefficient is lower than for business.
Cost: A linear coefficient per guilder. Highly significant for non-business purposes.
Travel- and wait time: For non-business short the wait time coefficient is 2.5 times
the travel time coefficient. For longer distances this ratio is 6.3 for non-business and
10.0 for business. For business short the ratio is set to 3.0 because it was not
possible to estimate a separate wait time coefficient.
Duration variables.. For longer trips car is more likely to be taken, because of
multiple destinations. For business trips shorter than six days, air is more likely to be
chosen. Bus is less attractive for business trips shorter than three days and holidays
longer than two weeks. This has to do with the amount of time and comfort relative
to the duration of the trip.
Season: Car is more likely to be taken in summer. For non-business air is less likely
to be taken in summer for European destinations and bus less likely in the winter.
Age." As expected younger and older people tend to use more public transport than
Long distance: For non-business Europe shorter than 750 km car is more likely. This
are people travelling from the southern Netherlands. For non-business short the train is
less likely above 750 kin.
The low number of business observations in the ETM resulted in statistically weak time
and cost coefficients for the business segments, but these still provide acceptable values
of time.
k-
Table 1: Main Mode Values of Time
Segment
Business Short
Business E_
Non-business Short
Non-business Europe
time coefficient
-0.001755
-0.002143
-0.004176
cost coefficient
-0.002788
-0.002317
-0.005874
value of time
f37.77
f55.49
f24.66
number of
observations
275
25__.____L_s
2119_______
7028
Calibration of the model system
The Schiphol Survey is used as the main source of data for the ILCM. This survey
contains some 100.000 interviews per year amongst all passengers departing from
Schiphol, including transfer and charter passengers. As this survey contains only air
trips from Schiphol, this data could not be used in the ILCM directly to provide a
representative sample of all long distance trips. Therefore, the ILCM model system
creates a synthetic database based on the Schiphol Survey.
The creation of the synthetic sample was done using the models that are implemented in
the ILCM to infer the number of relevant trips not observed in the Schiphol Survey.
The underlying assumption is that if for a certain trip from a known origin and to a
known destination, the model gives probability ot of using air from Schiphol, this trip
represents 1/o_ trips between this origin and destination departing from all airports and
using all modes. If, for instance, 100 vacation trips are observed between Gouda and
Marseilles departing from Schiphol, and the model gives probability 0.25 that such a trip
will go by air from Schiphol, we can infer that there have been 400 trips in total from
Gouda to Marseilles. Of those, 300 are either using another airport or going by road or
rail. The redistribution of these remaining unobserved trips is also done using the
probabilities from the ILCM models.
Problems with the ETM data made it impossible to estimate models using weighted,
expanded observations. In addition, lack of data necessitated using the same models for
residents of the Netherlands as for non-residents. As a result, extra calibration of the
main mode models was required in order to obtain a realistic base year main mode split.
This calibration is based on three data sources:
1. Prognose des Personenverkehrs in Europa bis :urn dahr 2005, tabellenband (IFO
Institut _r Wirtschafstsforschung);
Vakantie van Nederlanders 1996 (CBS);
3 Buitenlands'e toeristen m Nederland 1993'1994 (CBS).
The calibration data sources show that residents of the Netherlands and residents of
other countries do not have identical main mode choice behaviour. Because we use the
same main mode models for residents and non-residents, it was necessary to introduce
an extra penalty for all non-Hinterland production zones in Europe (except in the case of
UK and Ireland).
During calibration it appeared that the main mode models for business purposes, when
compared to the non-business models, had unexpectedly high train and/or coach shares
for Switzerland/Austria, Spain, Portugal and Italy, which needed to be corrected.
Table 2: Main Mode Choice final calibrated model
IDestination
Germany
UK
Ireland
France
'Denmark
Sweden/Norw.
Finland/Ice.
Switz/Austr.
Spain
Portugal
Italy
Greece
SE Europe
East Europe
ICA
total
air car train coach [total
16.2% 66.6% 7.7% 9.4% 100.00%
45.0% 35.3% 8.6% '11.2% 100.00%
82.6% 13.7% !1.7% 2.0% 100.00%
10.2% 63.8% 9.5% 16.4% 100.00%
54.2% 39.2% 1.9% 4.6% 100.00%
64.3% !22.9% 5.0% 7.8% 100.00%
72.6% 21.4% 0.4% 5.5% 100.00%
20.8% 57.6% 6.0% 15.6% 100.00%
53.4% 22.5% 3.2% 21.0% 100.00%
r83.1% 8.3% 0.8% 7.8% [100.00%
37.4% 36.6% 10.0% 16.0% 100.00%
86.0% 6.0% 5.9% 2.1% 100.00%
72.8% 17.0% 3.3% 6.9% 100.00%
36.7% 45.8% 5.5% 12.0% 100.00%
100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.00%
46.3% 37.0% 5.8% !10.9% 100.00%
In particular, the mode shares for the destinations Denmark, Switzerland/Austria,
Portugal and Greece are quite different in the calibrated results.
Germany: The targets from the available data sources could not be used directly,
because a part of Germany is Hinterland and can not be seen as a destination.
France: According to the two CBS data sources, residents of France travelling to the
Netherlands have a significantly different mode split from residents of the Netherlands
travelling to France. In particular, the air mode has a much higher share among French
than among Dutch residents.
Scandinavia: The uncalibrated models did not adequately reflect the very high air share
for these origins/destinations which appears in all three calibration data sources.
SwitzerlandAustria: The uncaiibrated models underestimated the air share to these
destinations, largely because the ETM sample included a large number of winter holiday
travellers to these countries going by car. This was not a good representation of non-
Dutch residents from this zone travelling to the Netherlands.
Italy: The high mode share of train and coach was caused by trips from non-Dutch
Hinterland origins, i.e. Belgium and Western part of Germany.
Trip frequency models
The market growth models in the ILCM are based on general economic indicators,
changes in the level of service (defined as the sum of the utilities of the main mode
model) and an exogenous trend. Four market segments are defined:
• business direct and negative transfer
• non-business direct and negative transfer
• business positive transfer
. non-business positive transfer
The market growth model is multiplicative and consists of the following factors:
• change m generalised costs: growth factor = (e ('_' 1o8,,,,- _,_ lo_m) ) clmticity
• income growth: (for non-business) expressed as an index, based on the input GDP
growth over the base year for the given scenario;
• trade growth: (for business) expressed as an average index for the production and
attraction side of the journey
- .
• exogenous trend: expressed as an index
The elasticity for generalised costs and trade growth can easily be changed with the user
interface. The default generalised cost elasticity is set to 0.1 for non-business and 0.0 for
business. These values are based on experience with other models developed by HCG,
but sensitivity tests of the ILCM were used to determine them.
In the current version of the ILCM, the positive transfer market has a choice of air and
combined HST/air routes. Positive transfer passengers are not permitted by the ILCM
to choose transfer airports other than Schiphol, or to travel by modes other than air.
One of the results of this structure is that, given the current market growth models, any
change in air level of service can result in extreme changes in the size of the positive
transfer market. For this reason we have not included generalised cost in the positive
transfer market growth calculations.
The business elasticity with respect to trade was estimated to be approximately 0.8.
The DGCA provided income elasticities for various time periods based on a standard
Euro 1 scenario _. The income elasticities are not applied exactly as they appear in Table
3. A single income elasticity value is used. This single elasticity is calculated as follows:
1. an income elasticity is calculated for each year between 1990 and 2030 by
interpolation based on the original values shown in Table 3;
2. the ILCM base year is 1994 and the new ILCM forecast year is 2020; a single
income elasticity for the period 1994-2020 is calculated by averaging the
interpolated values across the period 1994-2020.
Table 3: Incomeelasticitiesfor Euro 1scenario
1990 2015 2030
Eur- Eur 1.35 0.9 0.7
Eur- ICA 2.5 1.35 I.I
The average income elasticity for 1994-2020 that is applied in the ILCM is 1.04 for
intra-European travel and 1.71 for Europe-ICA travel. This elasticity is applied to the
total income growth over the entire forecast period.
2.4 High-speed rail in the ILCM
High-speed rail (HSR) has an impact on the travel choice on two levels: as an access
mode and as a main mode. As an access mode, HSR is treated as a fast train.
Introducing HSR as an alternative means that the access by train to relevant airports
improves. HSR can be used as an access mode from specific zones to four airports in the
ILCM: Schiphol, Brussels, Dusseldorf and Antwerp. As a main mode, HSR is included
as a separately defined, high quality travel alternative.
During the course of ILCM development, there was much discussion by HCG and
DGCA about exactly how high speed rail should be incorporated in the model system.
Evidence from other studies indicates that there is much stronger competition between
HSR and air travel than between HSR and any other mode:. In addition, several studies
have incorporated the idea of 'air-rail integration'. This integration entails a single-ticket
trip made by a combination of HSR and air with a 'seamless' transfer at a HSR station
located at an airport. 'Integration' means that the traveller experiences no difference in
service level (reservations, baggage handling, etc.) between the HSR portion of the trip
and the air portion. In other words, the HSR segment of the trip is the same as the
segment travelled by airplane, except that the HSR travels on the surface. The HSR
travel time is also comparable to air travel time for many destinations when considering
the high speed together with shortened access/egress time.
The ILCM includes HSR as a main mode by considering HSR routes to be alternative
"air" routes. This means that HSR is treated as an extension of the air mode. No
explicit choice between HSR and other modes takes place in the main mode models.
Instead, the determination of whether a trip is made by HSR depends on the route
choice.
Three types of HSR connections are incorporated in the ILCM:
• a trip made with a direct HSR route without any transfer
• a trip made by HSR with a transfer from one train to another (longer distance)
• a trip made using a combination of HSR and air segments.
The origin and destination of a given trip determine the availability of HSR as a route
alternative. For example, from Amsterdam to Paris, HSR may be an attractive
alternative. A person making a trip from Amsterdam to New York could take HSR to
Paris and fly from there to New York. It is unlikely, however, that someone would take
HSR to Paris and then fly to Marseilles. In the current version of the ILCM, HSR may
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.be used as the main mode for trips with destinations in Europe. The combination for
HSR and AIR is only available for intercontinental trips. For each destination only one
HST or HST/Air alternative route is modelled.
The incorporation of HSR into the airport/air route choice model entails not only the use
of a file of HSR routes but also the definition of 8 extra "ports", or HSR stations. Each
origin zone has access to a maximum of three HSR stations (including possible HSR
stations at selected airports). Depending on the corridor of the destination, South, East
or North, one HSR station is selected.
Positive transfer trips, which have origins and destinations outside the Hinterland but
transfer at Schiphol may use high-speed rail for one part of their routes. In the ILCM,
the choice between air routes and HSR routes for positive transfer trips is determined by
the route choice models. While the introduction of new HSR routes, as well as new air
routes, could change the transfer location of the positive transfer trips (from, say,
Schiphol to Frankfurt), the current version of the ILCM does not model this. The
change in competition between airports is not part of this model. The positive transfers
in the ILCM are based on 1994 information from the Schiphol survey. The only
changes to these trips in the ILCM are made in the market growth model, based on
economic changes, and route choice models.
In the ILCM, positive transfer trips are constrained to using Schiphol. One result of this
is that they can only use HSR if they transfer at Schiphol, also for direct HSR
connections. This is a-limitation placed on the ILCM to avoid processing large and
complex air and HSR networks and may be removed in future versions of the system.
For transfers originating outside Europe with destinations outside Europe, HSR is not
an option. The market growth model is executed for these trips, but not the route
choice model.
3.0 The ILCM in detail
3.1 Market definitions
The main area of interest for Dutch policy makers is, of course, the demand for use of
Dutch airports. The passenger markets for Schiphol and the regional airports of
Rotterdam, Eindhoven and Maastricht form the context in which the model system is
developed. HCG and DGCA recognised that the catchment area for these airports does
not consist solely of the Netherlands, but stretches beyond country borders.
Three different areas were identified for the model system:
• 28 zones in the Hinterland, which is the area from which Dutch airports can
reasonably be used as ports of departure for residents and visitors. It contains the
Benelux and the western parts of Germany. In addition to the four Dutch airports,
three competing departure airports in the hinterland are taken into account: Brussels,
Antwerr_ and Dusseldorf
22 zonesin the Rest of Europe. This is the area that can be reached from the
hinterland by air and by the competing land modes. The full model structure applies
here. Important European airports such as London, Paris and Frankfurt are not
considered as possible departure airports, but are taken into account as possible
transfer airports en route.
3.2
15 zones in the Rest of the World. These destinations can only be reached by air
from the hinterland, and thus the main mode choice model is not relevant for these
areas. The choice of air route is more often an important issue for intercontinental
travel. One can often reach these destinations either via the main European airports
or via other key hubs such as New York or Singapore.
Travel included in the ILCM
Travel between the origin zones in the hinterland and the destination zones outside the
hinterland is represented in the ILCM, along with travel from origins outside the
hinterland to destinations within. Shorter trips with both origin and destination within
the hinterland are excluded - these trips generate very little air travel. Some trips with
both origin and destination outside the hinterland can be important for the hub airports;
these transfers account for a substantial fraction of the passengers using Schiphol
airport. The transfer market is included in the ILCM but the choice behaviour of this
market is not modelled as completely as that of the non-transfer market.
Transfer trips can be split into two categories: positive transfers and negative transfers.
Positive transfers are made by passengers originating outside the I-Iintedand, changing
planes at Schiphol, and continuing on to a destination outside the Hinterland (Europe or
ICA). Negative transfers are defined as trips made by passengers originating inside the
Hinterland, changing planes at an airport outside the Hinterland (other European zones)
and continuing on to a destination outside the Hinterland (Europe or ICA), when a
direct route from the Hinterland to the destination exists.
The specific types of travel alternatives included in the ILCM are outlined in Table 4.
Table 4: Hinterland-Europe/ICA alternatives
Alternative Access Mode Departure
Direct Air
Indirect Air
HSR / Air
HSR
Train
Coach
Car
*: Predicted by the ILCM
Airport
s
s
Transfer
Airport
s
_e
Main Mode
8
i
*" The HSR route alternative is pre-delhaed
Departure Port in Hinterland. Transfer Port outside Hinterland
Table 4 shows that a long distance traveller can choose between either a land mode or
an air mode. In the future it is expected that HSR will allow convenient transfer to air at
the major Western European airports, so it is treated as an air mode for our purposes.
For all air modes, a traveller can choose between different access modes to get to the
departure airport, which is one of the airports in the hinterland. For HSR, which in the
- °
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the decision chain. An air and/or HSR traveller can either travel directly (by air or HSR)
or indirectly via a transfer airport. This is predicted by the air route choice model. For
modelling purposes, we currently assume that the transfer airport is outside the
hinterland, although in reality a small number of Schiphol passengers do change flights
at Brussels or Dusseldorf, both of which are in the hinterland. The large majority of
transfers, however, are via hub airports such as London, Paris, Frankfurt, Copenhagen
and Madrid.
Note that at the destination end of the trip, the choices of arrival airport and egress
mode are not modelled. Although these are also decisions that the traveller may have to
make, they are not very relevant for local policy purposes. Also note that the models
deal exclusively with outbound trips leaving the hinterland, although the ILCM does
take into account whether those trips are made by residents or by visitors returning
home. We implicitly assume that the choices for the inbound trips are symmetric, i.e.
that the traveller will return by the same mode, and that an air traveller will return to the
same airport.
3.3 Inputs to the ILCM system
Used in this way, the model system is essentially a pivot point procedure that predicts
changes in demand for Schiphol Airport. It can also provide estimates of changes in
demand for competing modes and airports, but these will clearly be less accurate than
those for Schiphol for which we have accurate base data.
In addition to the demand database, the supply side inputs are very important for the
model system to function properly. These inputs include travel times, distances and, for
some modes, cost and transfers between origins and destinations. For the development
of the ILCM, several data sources were used. Access mode travel times and distances
to airports were derived from the National Model System (LMS). For road and rail in
Europe, new European main networks were created to derive shortest paths. For air
travel times and frequencies, the ABC Guide database was used that contains details for
all scheduled flights serving the possible departure and transfer airports. Air fares were
based on regression equations derived from a sample of actual fares. The main variables
in the regressions are distance and fare class, with some variations allowed by
destination region (e.g. higher fares to Scandinavia).
For the HSR a kind of default level of service is created. This means that the travel
times are based on a full operational HSR network, the frequency is set to 10 times a
day and the prices are set equal to the air fares. From this point by the user interface it
is easy to define specific scenarios. Fare changes can be made for combined HSR/air
travelling separate from the air fares. Assumptions have been made about HSR check-in
and transfer times in combination with air travel. For within Europe, check-in time for
HSR trips is set at 5 minutes except for UK destinations, for which a 30-minute check-in
is required (more restrictive border controls). Transfer times are equal to check-in
times. For Hinterland-ICA combination routes, check-in is set at 90 minutes and
transfer to air at 60 minutes. This compares with 60 and 120-minute check-in times for
air within Europe and to ICA zones, respectively. Air-to-air transfer time is 60 minutes.
While "integration" of ticketing between HSR and air is implicit in the assumption of
interchangeable routes, no special integration of trains with airline check-in is assumed.
3.4 The ILCM user interface
HCG has developed a new ILCM user interface based on the specifications provided by
DGCA (Jan Veldhuis). The ILCM user shell has been developed to allow users of the
ILCM to perform the following:
• specify two types of modifications to model inputs: "scenario" and "policy" changes;
• apply (run) the model system
• view output results in the EXSYS program.
The structure from the user's perspective is shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2: ILCM application structure
.Schipholdatabase ___I
scenario and policydefinition t
by Chessboard J
ILCM model run __-_,growth model elasticities
_-_base level of service data j
I analysis of output with EXSYS I
For the scenario specifications the Chessboard (see Figure 3) allows the user to specify
aggregate or disaggregate changes on the main level of service variables. The user
modifications of these variables are organised into two categories: scenario changes and
policy changes. Scenario changes are meant to be background changes in economic
growth and national transport regulations, while policy changes are meant to be policies
implemented directly by the user of the ILCM (such as DGCA). Policy changes can also
be specified as additional tests beyond the changes in a standard forecast such as 'Global
Competition' (CPB 1997).
The tool to analyse the result of ILCM runs is called EXSYS. With Exsys it is possible
to compare different scenarios in a standard way. In addition to tables, it is possible to
create graphical output in EXSYS. This may be in the form of bar or pie charts as well
as in the form of simple maps. Below two examples of EXSYS graphics output are
shown.
Figure 3: Chessboard
scenario)
scenario)
io)
(policN)
)
(policy)
C7
Figure 4: Output graphic of the ILCM
The graphs shown here are based on the Global Competition forecasts made for the
Centraal Planbureau (1997) Three different scenarios were defined: Divided Europe,
European Co-ordination and Global Competition• This resulted in forecasts for
passengers from Schiphol and HSR-substitution of between 57 and 90 million and 3.8
and 64 million trips, respectively• The graph in Figure 5 shows that there are also HSR
travellers attracted from car aiad train modes. The bars in the second graph show,
respectively, the GC scenario without HSR and with HSR East and South fully available
for relevant destinations. The German and French destinations are aggregated
Figure 5: Main mode choice for trips with Dutch origins
Main mode Change by HSR 2020 GC
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4. Future model development
The ILCM provides analysis of Amsterdam Airport Schiphol in relation to surrounding,
competing airports and competing surface travel modes. While it is highly developed in
terms of estimating total pa._'_'enger travel demand, main mode choice and air route
choice, it does not yet provide any information relating to freight. The ILCM's demand
forecasts are not capacity-constrained, nor do they provide data on aircraft movements.
The next phase of ILCM development is likely to include the incorporation of new
modules for freight demand, aircraft movements and fleet composition.
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Airport Competition - Myth and Reality
Presented By:
Mr. Tom Haughey, Aer RJanta Group Strategy Manager
UCD Conference, July 1998
The Public Policy Framework 0
The majority of European ai_orts are state or city owned enterprises. It is appropriate then to view the growing
importance of competition i,_ ",he airport business within the framework of a changing public policy perspective.
This perspective which is be=oming increasingly popular, at both State and EU levels, views airports and state
enterprises generally, as being essentially monopolistic businesses and. therefore, advocates a change to a more
entrepreneurial approach, wi_ clear objectives, greater efficiency, accountability and better value for money.
The means of achieving this change are seen as inherent in a private sector approach to management, with a
focus on competitiveness, responsiveness and performance.
There is an important European aspect to this policy debate. The EU advisory group on competitiveness chaired
by former Italian Prime Minister Carlo Azeglio Ciampi submitted a report in 1995 which recognised that
without a stronger, competitive basis in the fields of energy, public transport and telecommunications, the
European economy would fred itself at a disadvantage. The group considered the various experiences of
restructuring and the introduction of competitive pressures into various public utilities, and decided that "what
matters most is not so much that the ownership and management of public utilities moves from the State to the
private sector, as that competition is introduced and extended wherever possible". This is an important
distinction. Rather than simply recommending the importation of a private sector approach to traditional public
sector business, as a means to a more competitive end, Ciampi saw the primary concern as the introduction of
more competitive processes, regardless of whether a business existed in the realms of the public or the private
sector. To be in one sphere or the other was not necessarily seen as an impediment to effective and efficient
operations.
In light of this, the challenge for airport management is to ensure that balance is maintained between competing
tensions. It must ensure that values such as efficiency and professionalism, which are driving the shift towards
competition, are incorporated into its approach, whilst preserving traditional values such as due process and
integrity. In the face of increasing competitive pressures it is also important to ensure that inappropriate policy
initiatives, which are engendered by the more challenging environment and pose significant threats to the
efficient management of airport enterprises, are avoided.
Competition at Airports
As the i,:temal European air transport market is liberalised and air service agreements with non-EU states
become less restrictive, competition between European airports has increased dramatically. This is mainly due
to the fa:: that, apart from high-demand hubs such as Heathrow and Frankfurt, many airports can no longer
count or. having a captive market. Airlines, passengers and freight forwarders can choose between airports, and
passenz-.rs and cargo may also choose to utilise other forms of transport e.g. high speed rail.
We can identify several different forms of competition between and at airports viz.;
I. Competition for a role as a hub airport and for transfer traffic between hubs
2. Competition to attract new airline sarvices - passengers and freight
3. Competition for the provision of services at airports
4. Competition between airports with overlapping hinterlands
5. Competition between airports within urban areas
6. Competition between airport terminals
Competition For A Role As A Hub Airport and for Transfer Traffic Between
Hubs
Development as a hub has major economic and revenue generating implications for airports. As a result,
competition to attain and maintain hub status is fierce. In Europe alone, London Heathrow, Frankfurt, Paris
CDG and Amsterdam Schiphol all have their own plans to cater for the growth in air traffic through the
provision of appropriate infrastructure and the development of new routes.
Transfer traffic is an essential element in the development of airport hubs. Such passengers are also vital to the
success of airline global scheduled service networks, as the passenger composition of any long haul-flight will
show. Less than a quarter of the passengers on a recent flight from Gatwick to Dallas originated from the
London area, the remainder transferred from a myriad of other originating points.
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Source: British Airways News, 19th July 1996
Transfer traffic represents approximately 45% of passenger traffic at hubs such as Frankfurt and Copenhagen.
40% at Amsterdam and 30% at London Heathrow. Put in perspective, more passengers transfer between flights
at Heathrow or Frankfurt than arrive at or depart from Zurich Airport each year.
As the number of airline groupings declines through such developments as global alliances and code-sharing.
the opportunities for airports to attract hub traffic and gain the resulting benefits in terms of route development
will reduce. Airports cannot compete for transfer passengers through ticket pricing strategy (prices are
obviously controlled by the airlines). In addition, they are largely dependant on the operating strategy of the
home airline to bring in transfer passengers. However, successful airports have demonstrated that they can
influence passengers choice of routes and carriers by exercising their control over key factors such as minimum
connect times, transfer systems, flight schedules, and passenger services.
Competition to Attract Airline Services
Historically airports tended to play a passive role in the development of their air services, sitting back and
waiting for the airlines to arrive. However, many airports have now recognised the substantial benefits which
can be gained through marketing and increased competition to attract airline services has been the primar,."
result of this trend. Airports are now taking a leading role in initiating interest among the airlines, for both
passenger and freight services. This activity usually entails undertaking market research, route forecasts and
sometimes financial evaluations in order to identify the most attractive routes for airlines to operate.
Competition to attract new airline services has also led to airports offering support through joint promotional
campaigns and, in some cases, reductions in airport charges. Competition for new long haul services is
particularly keen.
Competition for the Provision of Services at Airports
The principle of transparency which has long been advocated in the awarding of public service contracts is now
being extended to the airport environment. Airport users rising concerns with regard to the "contestabilit?' of
markets" has meant that services which were traditionally carried out by the airport authority or one of its
subsidiary, companies (e.g. ground handling and catering) are increasingly becoming subject to public tender.
The new competitive environment has also meant that airport management must also be extremely careful with
regard to its relationships with the providers of services.
The way in which an airport service is provided (i.e. either by the airport authority or by a third party.) and
whether there are competing services will clearly impact on the airport's competitive position in both price and
quality terms. It will also affect revenue and cost levels and the level of investment needed. The liberalisation of
ground handling services at European airports, for example, is having a particularly significant effect on
revenues and employment at many airports.
Competition Betxveen Airports With Overlapping Hinterlands
Most major cities tend to be located at least 200 kms apart. As a general rule. the shorter the distance to the next
tit2,.' and the more equal in size its airport, tile greater the portion of hinterlandoverlap and the greater the
competition between the airports. Examples include East Midlands,'Birmingham: Brussels/Amsterdam:
.Milar_,Turin and Manchester,:Liverpool. The slide illustrates the extent to which hinterland overlap is
experienced by some Northern European airports. Amsterdam Schiphol have estimated that 65-80% of its
passengers have a choice between airports.
Circle radius = 200km
Many countries are working towards making their airports effective parts of high speed rail networks. The
impact of these moves will be to expand the extent of airport hinterlands and hinterland overlaps further into
the re'_,ions - Paris CDG has a high speed train station and can be reached from Lille (210kin). Tours (240kin)
and ;elms (200kin) within one hour. A journey from Nantes (440km). Bordeaux (SS0km) and Strasbourg
(490kin) can be achieved in less than t_vo hours. Furthermore, airlines concentrating on hub development see
rail connections as another form of spoke mechanism and thereby an effective means of strengthening their
hubs - KLM have svttdied this for the development of their Schiphol hub. Thus. airports which may have
viewed themselves as having clearly defined geographic hinterlands all to themselves, are increasingly finding
that their territor).' is being encroached upon as a result of the increasing integration of transport modes, thereb?
tbrcine them to compete against airports which they might never have viewed as competitors in the past.
ClearlY', Dublin competes with both privately owned Belfast airports in this way - competition which can only
intensify as the road network between Dublin and Belfast is upgraded to motorway standards.
Finally. the time element of the flight can have an important bearing on the extent or"hinterland scope.
Passen,.zers on short haul flights are more inclined to depart from the airport nearest to them. whereas those on
long haul flights are willing to travel further to connect to it. it" for example, a compe:mg airport can otter a
better airline service or a more direct routing.
Competition Between-Airports Within Urban Areas
Relatively few cities in the' w_/have more than one airport and in cities where this does occur it is often the
case that the airports are owned by the same company, for example Aeroports de Paris owns Paris/CDG,
Paris/Orly and Le Bourget; the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey owns the three New York airports
- JFK, La Guardia and Newark.
Examples of competing airports in the same urban area include Belfast (Belfast City Airport and Belfast
International) and Washington (Washington Dulles and Washington National), while to a lesser degree, Luton
and London City compete with the BAA's London airports. Overall, however, the experience in managing
multi-airport systems indicates that carriers are extremely reluctant to fly to a new or second airport without
being forced to do so by the regulatory authorities. The advantage in terms of traffic demand at the primary
airport can persist for decades, e.g. in making its case for access to Heathrow slots for its transatlantic services
in 1990, Virgin produced data to support its contention that average yields on routes from Heathrow were some
15% higher than those available at Gatwick. Indeed carriers and passengers are so wedded to the primary
airports at cities that many administrations and airport authorities actually close an old airport when they
develop a new one to ensure the viability of the new facility e.g. Denver, Oslo. An exception to this was the
case of Montreal's Dorval Airport which was not closed when the new airport, Mirabel, was opened in the
1970"s. Over tv,'o decades later, Transport Canada was forced to close Mirabel to scheduled services following
the carriers determined opposition to transfer from the older facility. One can ordy speculate as to what will
happen in Milan over the next few years following the Italian authorities recent decision to compel carriers to
move from Linate to Malpensa airport where heavy investment in facilities has just been completed. The
transfer is being fiercely resisted by the airlines and is being challenged in law by those concerned.
A recent proposal for a second, independently owned airport for Dublin was turned doxsnn by the Irish
Government in 1996. One of the bases for this decision was that the international experience of tnvo airport
cities indicated that a second airport in Dublin would not be effective. Issues such as duplication of
infrastructure and facilities, problematic traffic transfer between the airports, higher costs and problems for
route integration and hubbing were cited as not supporting the case for a second airport for Dublin.
Competition Between Terminals at Airports
The situation where the airfield owner does not own and operate some, or all, of its terminals is rare in Europe.
Recently, however, airport privatisation has increasingly been touted as one way to fulfil the need for new
funding sources, whilst simultaneously providing increased efficiencies. A potentially damaging aspect of this
debate is the tendency of media commentators to suggest that competition between terminals at airports would
promote efficiency and reduced cost, without producing any supporting data or arguments other than a mantra
that competition is good for all, in all situations. On the level of the debate to date, one could argue for two Lee
Tunnels or two East Link bridges as being in the interests of efficiency.
Lack of single ownership and control at airports can result in serious problems for strategic planning and for
financial and operations management. ESccess capacity must be created in order for competition to take place
with the resulting higher costs necessarily passed to airline customers. Apron and safety management issues can
be difficult to overcome. Finally, such alsproaches have often introduced a degree of rigidity to the airport
situation when what is needed in the increasingly competitive environment is more management flexibility.
Examples of airports where there was some semblance of competition between terminals are John F.
Kennedy Airport in New York and Pearson Airport in Toronto. In the case of the former there are self evident
problems in relation to airport management and development, particularly regarding access transport and
funding for long term developments.
In the latter case, a scarcity of capital and inadequacies in the running and development of the airport led the
Government of Canada to seek the participation of the private sector in the provision of a third terminal at
Toronto's Lester B. Pearson International Airport in 1986. That decision set in motion a process which resulted
in arrangements whereby T3 was financed, designed, constructed, managed and operated by an independent
private sector developer, Claridges, under a long term ground lease.
The T3 experience led the government to attempt to follow the same privatisation route for the redevelopment
and refurbishment of the two older terminals at Pearson in 1990. The attempt subsequently collapsed following
a general election campaign, amidst allegations of bid rigging, patronage, undue political influence, excessive
lobbying and claims that the project was not in the public interest. A Government enquiry was subsequently set
up to examine what happened at Pearson over the decade up to 1996 at which the CX of the T3 investment
company, Claridges, recorded that his _oup would not have got involved in Terminal 3 if they had not
expected to obtain management rights over Terminals I and 2 in due course. This looks like an admission that
Claridges were looking for a low cost route to ownership and control of Pearson.
In December i 996, control of Pearson was transferred from Transport Canada to the Greater Toronto Airports
Authority, (GTAA), a not-for-profit company controlled by the local authority. GTAA aims to proceed with
expansion plans for the airport, including the development of a unified modem terminal building to replace
Terminal i and ultimately Terminal 2 as passenger traffic demands. On April 1st 1997, the Greater Toronto
Airports Authority made an agreement to purchase Terminal 3 at Pearson for $719 million ($199 million more
thanit costobuildfiveyears before). The prevailing view seems to be that Canada's foray into creating inter-
terminal competition between the public and private sectors caused more problems than it solved. There now
appears to be consensus in Canadian aviation circles to have the entire airport under one ownership and control.
"The government has recognised that rather than lease airport facilities in a fragmented manner, it is more
effective to lease the entire airport asset as a unified operation....the purchase of Terminal 3 by the Authority
removes the last remnant of the earlier privatisation philosophy and is, in my view, consistent with the latest
thinking in airport management."
(Louis Turpen, GTAA President and CEO).
There are two current examples of proposals to provide competition between terminals which are worth noting
- the cases are in relation to the proposed development of Terminal 5 at Heathrow and of Huntstown at Dublin
Airport. The recent MMC Report on the BAA rejected proposals by a company calling itself Enlightened
Competition which suggested that the construction and operation of Heathrow's Terminal 5 should be subject
to public tender, whilst both the Minister for Transport, Energy and Communications and the County Council
refused the Huntstown proposal for a second terminal at Dublin Airport on some very strong grounds in May of
1997. In essence, their view was that the best way to grow Dublin Airport is to maximise existing facilities.
They also felt that Huntstown was not in the best interests of Dublin Airport, that it was premature, lacked
adequate services and access, and was in the wrong location.
Conclusion
Public policy trends, both at EU and member state level, would appear to be moving in the direction of
introducing competitive pressures into areas of the EU economy which have been traditionally isolated from
them in the past. Airports appear to be prime targets in this drive.
As a result, airport managers, can reasonably expect various policy initiatives to arise in relation to the issue of
competition at airports in the future. Some of these initiatives could well be unsuited to the efficient and
effective management of airports. It is therefore most important that airports be closely involved in aviation
policy development, especially in the light of inappropriate policy decisions made elsewhere which have
hindered the efficient management of airports.
Aer Rianta welcomes the increasing focus on competitiveness and efficiency and is confident that all objective
assessments of these measures will confirm that it is at the forefront of European airports in regard to the
competitiveness of its airport charges, return on investment, cost of providing capacity increases, manpower
efficiency etc. Aer Rianta's strengths have been proven through the success it has achieved in the highly
competitive international business in which it is engaged and commentators who are prepared to explore
beyond the level of the sound bite should be able to ascertain these facts for themselves.
The Air Transport Research Group of the WCTR Society was formally launched as a
special interest group at the 7 th Triennial WCTR in Sydney, Australia in 1995. Since then,
our membership base has expanded rapidly, and now includes over 400 active
transportation researchers, policy-makers, industry executives, major corporations and
research institutes from 28 countries. It became a tradition that the ATRG would hold an
international conference at least once a year. In 1998, the ATRG organized a consecutive
stream of 14 aviation sessions at the 8th Triennial WCTR Conference (July 12-17:
Antwerp). Again, on 19-21 July, 1998, the ATRG Symposium was organized and
executed every successfully by Dr. Aisling Reynolds-Feighan of the University College
of Dublin. The Aviation Institute at the University of Nebraska at Omaha has published
the Proceedings of the 1998 ATRG Dublin Symposium (being co-edited by Dr. Aisling
Reynolds-Feighan and Professor Brent Bowen), and the Proceedings of the 1998 WCTR-
ATRG Conference (being co-edited by Professors Tae H. Oum and Brent Bowen).
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